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Abstract
In this dissertation we try to achieve secrecy enhancement in communications by resorting to both
cryptographic and information theoretic secrecy tools andmetrics. Our objective is to unify tools
and measures from cryptography community with techniques and metrics from information theory
community that are utilized to provide privacy and confidentiality in communication systems. For
this purpose we adopt encryption techniques accompanied with privacy amplification tools in order
to achieve secrecy goals that are determined based on informati n theoretic and cryptographic
metrics.
Every secrecy scheme relies on a certain advantage for legitimate users over adversaries viewed
as an asymmetry in the system to deliver the required security for data transmission. In all of
the proposed schemes in this dissertation, we resort to either in erently existing asymmetry in
the system or proactively created advantage for legitimateusers over a passive eavesdropper to
further enhance secrecy of the communications. This advantage is manipulated by means of privacy
amplification and encryption tools to achieve secrecy goalsfor the system evaluated based on
information theoretic and cryptographic metrics.
In our first work discussed in Chapter 2 and the third work explained in Chapter 4, we rely on a
proactively established advantage for legitimate users based on eavesdropper’s lack of knowledge
about a shared source of data. Unlike these works that assumean error-free physical channel, in the
second work discussed in Chapter 3 correlated erasure wiretap channel model is considered. This
work relies on a passive and internally existing advantage for legitimate users that is built upon
statistical and partial independence of eavesdropper’s channel errors from the errors in the main
channel. We arrive at this secrecy advantage for legitimateusers by exploitation of an authenticated
but insecure feedback channel.
ix
From the perspective of the utilized tools, the first work discussed in Chapter 2 considers a
specific scenario where secrecy enhancement of a particularblock cipher called Data Encryption
standard (DES) operating in cipher feedback mode (CFB) is studied. This secrecy enhancement
is achieved by means of deliberate noise injection and wiretap channel encoding as a technique
for privacy amplification against a resource constrained eavesdropper. Compared to the first work,
the third work considers a more general framework in terms ofboth metrics and secrecy tools.
This work studies secrecy enhancement of a general cipher bas d on universal hashing as a privacy
amplification technique against an unbounded adversary. Inthis work we also reach to the goal of
exponential secrecy where information leakage to adversary, that is assessed in terms of mutual
information as an information theoretic measure and Eve’s distinguishability as a cryptographic
metric, decays at an exponential rate. In the second work generally encrypted data frames are
transmitted through Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) protocolto generate a common random
source between legitimate users that later on is transformed into information theoretically secure
keys for encryption by means of privacy amplification based on universal hashing.
In chapter 5, we discuss possible future works as an extension of the accomplished research in




In introduction we first discuss our main objectives in this dissertation and then present a brief
preview of some concepts that are required as the basis of discussion in next chapters. First of
all, a big picture that demonstrates the overall theme of this dissertation is given in Section 1.1.
In this section two major common themes threading throughout the dissertation are discussed and
then similarities and differences between different works presented in next chapters are analyzed
concentrating on these unifying ideas.
Section 1.2 provides a brief preview of some information theoretic concepts like entropy and
statistical distance that will be used throughout the dissertation. An introduction to physical layer
secrecy and wiretap channel encoder based on secrecy capacity metric is presented in Section
1.3. We describe symmetric-key encryption and block ciphered systems in Section 1.4 that also
presents a background for known plaintext attack and in particular linear cryptanalysis. In our
first work discussed in Chapter 2, wiretap channel encoding is adopted as a privacy amplification
technique along with a block ciphered system against eavesdropper. In this work secrecy capacity
is utilized to evaluate security of the whole scheme, and linear cryptanalysis is considered as the
basis of Eve’s performance analysis.
Section 1.5 explains the principle of secret key agreement with emphasis on physical layer based
secret key sharing. Section 1.6 provides a required background for privacy amplification as the
main component in most information theoretic key generation algorithms. In particular, it discusses
universal class of hash functions and randomness extractors as two major techniques for privacy
amplification. Universal hashing is utilized as the main approach for privacy amplification in our
works in Chapters 3 and 4. Note that the proposed method for key agreement in Chapter 3 lies in
1
the category of physical layer based key sharing algoritms.The concept of randomness extractors
is discussed in Chapter 4 where we try to define a new notion for extracting randomness.
Section 1.7 describes some secrecy metrics including mutual information, attacker’s error prob-
ability and Eve’s distinguishability that are adopted for secrecy analysis in next chapters. We also
comparatively explain advantages and weaknesses of each one of these metrics. Mutual informa-
tion as an information theoretic secrecy metric is used in all works in this dissertation to measure
secrecy of the proposed schemes. Attacker’s error probability or success rate is another metric that
is adopted to evaluate secrecy of the ciphers in the works present d in Chapters 2 and 4. Eve’s
distinguishability is a universally composable metric used by cryptography community whereby
performance of the proposed secrecy scheme in Chapter 4 is evaluated.
1.1 The Big Picture
The research on physical layer secrecy, which was initiatedby Wyner’s seminal work [1], has
extended to many new problems and channel models including single-antenna, multiple-antenna,
broadcast, interference, multiple-access channels etc, and m inly involves information theory (IT)
community. On the other hand, researchers who work on ciphers, authenticated encryption etc,
and rely on provable security are from theoretical computerscience (CS) and crypto community.
Both communities try to enhance secrecy, but from two different angles. The first one focuses on
physical layer based techniques and protocols and relies oninf rmation theoretic metrics to reach
perfect secrecy against unbounded adversary, but these techniques mostly require some knowledge
or assumptions about eavesdropper’s physical channel. Thelatter one utilizes cryptographic tools
in higher layers, and relies on complexity based metrics against resource constrained adversary.
They mainly discuss how much computationally hard it is for an adversary to mount the cryptanal-
ysis and obtain some knowledge about system secrets.
Although IT-based security aims at reaching a stronger notio of secrecy than cryptographic
based secrecy, its main disadvantage is that it relies on physical channel conditions that is not
2
realistic in most cases. Moreover, physical layer based secrecy does not conform with end-to-
end or link-wise secrecy, used mainly in internet or networksecurity, where one may have no
information about utilized communication channel or available techniques in physical layer. There
have been some works that attempted to merge techniques and notions from both communities
and achieve a stronger notion of secrecy but with lesser assumptions. In [2], Maurer exploited
privacy amplification as a cryptographic tool with correlatd randomness created based on public
discussion and two-way communication model. The main advantage of Maurer’s work was that it
did not require this strong assumption that the adversary channel is noisier than the receiver one.
Nevertheless, works in this line of research still require some knowledge of physical channel.
From crypto community, Bellare et.al in [3, 4] related IT-based secrecy metrics to provable
security based on eavesdropper’s advantage. They argued that IT-based metric which amounts to
Eve’s information in terms of mutual information is a relatively weak notion of secrecy since it
resorts to the assumption that the input source has uniform distribution that is not necessarily
true in realistic scenarios. Thus, they developed a new notio of mutual information security that
requires Eve’s information to be negligible for any possible input distribution. However, in this
work privacy amplification is utilized in the context of wiretap channel which still requires some
knowledge about physical channel condition. Recently some res archers from crypto community
adopted information theoretic and statistical metrics like variational distance to measure secrecy
enhancement against adversaries with unbounded computational power [4–8].
In all security schemes, confidentiality or authenticationis built upon establishing some cer-
tain advantages or asymmetry of what legitimate users shareover an adversary. For instance, in
symmetric encryption Alice and Bob share a secret key that is unknown to eavesdropper where
to measure secrecy we need to quantify how much effort with what success probability it takes
for a bounded adversary to obtain the correct key. Physical layer secrecy requires a wiretapper
channel that is degraded compared to the main channel eitherd rectly or through public discussion
[1, 2, 9]. Some key extracting approaches assume that there alr ady exists some random source of
3
data shared between Alice and Bob that is partially secure from adversary rendering the required
asymmetry to the system from which a highly secure key can be derived through privacy amplifi-
cation [6, 10]. Reconciliation is an important step in most key agreement algorithms to generate
this correlated randomness partially unknown to Eve that presents asymmetry in the system. This
common randomness in the system can be established by the aidof a third party which supplies ad-
ditional correlated information [11], existence of a public d scussion and feedback communication
[12, 13] or through existing extractable randomness in physical channel [14].
The overall theme of this dissertation is to bridge the gap betwe n two communities: IT com-
munity and crypto community. In particular, our objective is to combine cryptographic tools and
metrics together with secrecy enhancement techniques and measures in IT-based security into a
single framework. Indeed, we try to leverage strength of both approaches to enhance secrecy in
communications. In all of these works we attempt to take advantage of the existing or created
asymmetry in favor of legitimate users over Eve by utilizingprivacy amplification accompanied
with encryption.
In Chapter 2 based on our work in [15], this asymmetry is provided through cipher keys shared
between Alice and Bob about which Eve has no information. As a special case we use DES block
cipher operating in CFB mode for encryption. We add adjustable noise into generated ciphertexts,
thereby creating further difficulty for a resource constrained adversary who mounts linear crypt-
analysis against this cipher. This additional hardness is manifested in reduced success probability
of linear attack that consequently in multiple frames turnsEve’s channel into a degraded version
of the main channel. It provides additional secrecy in termsof secrecy capacity, as an information
theoretic measure, that can be manipulated by a secrecy encod r applied over multiple frames to
intensify Eve’s uncertainty and deliver highly secure transmission. Therefore, secrecy encoder can
be considered as a special class of privacy amplification techniques. In this work all procedure
is performed in application layer in the context of end-to-end secrecy without any assumption on
physical channel condition.
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In Chapter 3 based on the work in [16], a two-way communicationscheme based on ARQ
mechanism exploits the authenticated but insecure feedback ch nnel between targeted recipient and
the transmitter, to create advantage over a passive adversary whose channel is partially independent
from the main channel. We adopted a general packet erasure channel model that mostly conforms
with link-wise communication. This work relies on statistical independence of Eve’s channel from
the main channel to provide advantage for Alice and Bob when a feedback channel is utilized to
create a correlated randomness that is guaranteed to have a sufficient uncertainty on Eve’s side.
This random set shared between Alice and Bob is created over a data frame containing a large
number of packets that are encrypted using the same symmetric k y. By application of privacy
amplification based on universal hashing over this generated randomness we obtain information
theoretically secure keys that can be utilized for encryption of the next data frame. As a result, this
work can be viewed as exploitation of cryptographic and information theoretic secrecy means to
further enhance security based on the created advantage through two-way communication.
The third work presented in Chapter 4 based on [17] has more similarities with our first work
since both, unlike the second work, assume an error free physical channel. In both of them encryp-
tion is used as a baseline to deliver primitive security overwhich applying privacy amplification
enables highly confidential message transmission. Inverseuniv rsal hashing technique adopted in
this work has similar properties with the wiretap channel encoding of the first work since both of
them cause further confusion for Eve by injecting some freshandomness into transmitted data for
the purpose of privacy amplification.
The third work takes into account a more generalized settinghan the first one in terms of met-
rics and secrecy approaches. In this work unlike the first onewe do not specify the type of ci-
pher instead consider a general cipher that generates key streams from cipher keys and combines
them with plaintexts. Moreover, compared to the first work that assumes there already exists a key
scheduling scheme that generates uniformly distributed keys, here we only require an initial key
source shared between Alice and Bob that is partially known toEve. We tailor to this weak source
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of randomness as the main asymmetry in favor of legitimate users and design a key generating
scheme to extract nearly uniform keys out of it, later on being used as cipher keys. In this work
we adopt variational distance or Eve’s distinuishability as a universally composable metric from
crypto community and information leakage in terms of mutualinformation as a strong secrecy
metric from IT community. In terms of commonality with the second work both of them assume
a computationally unbounded passive eavesdropper distinguishing them from the first work with a
resource constrained adversary.
In summary, a common theme threading in all of these works is to es ablish and manipulate
secrecy advantage using cryptographic and information theoretic tools in order to achieve a higher
level of secrecy in communication evaluated on the basis of metrics from both communities.
1.2 Review of Basics on Information Theory
Information theory provides measures to quantify uncertainty of random variables [18]. LetX,
Y be two random variables, withX , Y as their sets of values, andPX(x) = Pr[X = x] and
PY (y) = Pr[Y = y] as their probability distributions. The entropy ofX is defined as:H(X) =
−∑x∈X PX(x) logPX(x). When the logs are in base 2, entropy measures uncertainty of its ut-
come in bits.H(X) takes the maximum valuelog |X| whenX has uniform distribution, that
presents the highest randomness.
Conditional entropy is defined as:H(X|Y ) = −∑y∈Y PY (y)
∑
x∈X PX|Y (x|y) logPX|Y (x|y)
which measures the remaining uncertainty or randomness inX whenY is known. The mutual
informationI(X;Y ) between two random variablesX andY is defined asI(X;Y ) = H(X) −
H(X|Y ) that measures the information known aboutX provided thatY is observed. Due to its
symmetric propertyI(X;Y ) = I(Y ;X). Note that both conditional entropy and mutual informa-
tion take the maximum value ofH(X) whenX andY are totally independent.
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Let P̃X be a uniform distribution onX . L1 distance ofPX from uniform distribution is




Statistical distance between two distributions is half theL1 distance between them. When statistical
distance ofX from uniform distribution is at mostε, it is called thatX is ε-close to uniform. When
the distributionPY of the random variableY and the joint distribution ofPX,Y are given, we get
d1(PX,Y , P̃X × PY ) =
∑
x,y











PY (y)d1(PX|Y=y, P̃X). (1.2)









Then, we can define the conditional Rényi entropy as









As another measure of difference between two distributions, we can obtain distance ofPX from



















The following inequality in [21] characterizes the relationship between KL-divergence andL1
distance





We can define min-entropy of random variableX as
H∞(X) = min
x∈X







We say thatX is ak-source ifH∞(x) ≥ k, i.e. if for all x ∈ X , PX(x) ≤ 2−k.
1.3 Wiretap Channel Secrecy
The notion of perfect secrecy in information theoretic terms was introduced by Shannon [22].
Suppose that Alice tries to securely transmit ak-bit packetM to a legitimate receiver Bob across
a public channel. IfM is encoded by Alice into a transmittedn-bit codewordX, perfect secrecy is
said to be achieved ifI(M;X)=0 ; meaning that the mutual information betweenM andX has to be
zero. Shannon showed that in order to achieve this goal, Alice and Bob need to sharek bits of the
secret keys. This requires existence of a one-time pad whichis an additive cipher that Xors message
with a shared secure key of the same length of the message to generat a ciphertext. One-time pad
is a theoretical cipher that is practically impossible to implement.
In his pioneering work [1] in 1975, Wyner introduced an alternative notion of communication
known as wiretap channel coding with the general model shownin Fig. 1.1. In this model, the
legitimate parties Alice and Bob are separated by a channel call d main channel, and Eve observes
information transmitted by Alice through a channel called wiretapper’s channel, where these two
channels are supposed to be discrete memoryless channels (DMCs).k-bit messageM is encoded
by Alice into ann-bit codewordX, but what Bob and Eve observe across two different channels
are denoted byY and Z, respectively.M̂ is the decoder output at the receiver end. Alice does
encoding such that not only canY be decoded intoM with arbitrarily small error probability, but
alsoZ should not reveal any valuable information aboutM beyond what is available a priori. The
first goal known asreliability requirement can be formulated aslimk→∞ Pr[M 6= M̂ ] = 0, and
the second objective known as thes curity requirement can be formulated byI(M ;Z)/n → 0
asn → ∞, meaning that for a large number of channel uses the average mutual information rate
between Eve’s knowledge and the secure message has to be negligibl . Wyner showed that we can
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FIGURE 1.1. Wiretap channel
achieve both objectives by forward coding without any need for secret key sharing when these two
channels satisfy the required conditions.
We should note that both reliability and security constraints are information theoretic rather than
computational with the assumption that adversary is computationally unbounded. In other words,
unlike cryptographic approaches that rely on computational hardness of the attack for adversary,
Wyner’s information theoretic secrecy does not depend on any assumptions on the wiretapper’s
resources and capabilities of any kind. Namely, physical layer secrecy provides a stronger notion
of secrecy than complexity based cryptographic approaches. The results of Wyner’s work have
been extended to many contexts, most notably Gaussian channels [23] and broadcast channels
with confidential messages [9].
The largestk/n for which both objectives of reliability and security are achievable in commu-
nication is called secrecy capacity which is a function of both main and wiretapper’s channels. In
[1] Wyner showed that if the wiretapper’s channel is a concaten ion of the main channel and an-
other DMC, meaning that it is a degraded version of the main chanel, the secrecy capacity will be
positive. Csiszar et.al in [9] proved that when the main channel is less noisythan the wiretapper’s
channel, the secrecy capacity is positive. In other words, they showed that when the capacity of the
main channel is higher than that of the wiretapper’s, we would intuitively expect a positive secrecy
capacity. When two channels are arbitrary, computation of secrecy capacity in general is an open
problem. Suppose thatX has distribution ofPX(x). Let I(X;Y ) andI(X;Z) denote the mutual
information between Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve, respectively. It is proven in [24] by Van Dijk that if
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I(X;Y ) andI(X;Z) are individually maximized by the same input distribution of PX(x), and the
main channel(X → Y ) is less noisy than the wire-tap channel(X → Z), The secrecy capacity
for the wire-tap channel will be
Cs = Capacity(X → Y )− Capacity(X → Z). (1.9)
In Wyner-type encoder redundancy will be added to correct errors that occur across the main
channel, and randomness is added for keeping Eve ignorant across the wiretap channel. If an en-
coder with information transmission rate ofRs = k/n satisfies the reliability and security require-
ments for a given wiretap channel with secrecy capacity ofCs, such thatRs = Cs, then it is said
that such an encoder achieves the secrecy capacity. Most of the work in the context of wiretap
channel encoding rely on non-constructive random-coding framework with an argument that when
the secrecy capacity is positive there exist codes that achieve secrecy capacity.
It should be pointed out that a general wiretap channel encodi g is based on coset-coding or
syndrom-coding that goes back to the works by Wyner, [1, 25].This approach is further general-
ized and extended in [26, 27]. Coset-coding technique utilizes two binary linear codes: an inner
code and an outer code. The inner code is a subset of outer code, assuming that the difference in
their dimension isk, the outer code can be divided into2k cosets of the inner code. Each message
corresponds to a linearly chosen coset, but what is transmitted by Alice is a uniform randomly
selected codeword in that coset. Indeed, the outer code provides error correction across the main
channel and therefore guarantees reliability, but the inner code based on which the choice of the
codeword is randomized ensures secrecy. As a result, the problem is to construct inner and outer
codes that satisfy both reliability and secrecy constraints a d achieve the secrecy capacity. How-
ever, it is still a challenge to design an outer code that can be decoded across the main channel.
So far, the constructive solution for the wiretap channel problem is only available in some spe-
cial cases. For instance, when the wiretap channel is binaryer sure channel (BEC) and the main
channel is noiseless, a special class of LDPC codes are proposed in [28, 29], that are proven to
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achieve secrecy capacity. Recently, in [30], Mahdavifar et.al. used polar codes to construct coding
schemes that can achieve secrecy capacity for a wider range of channel models that are symmetric
with binary inputs.
1.4 Basics on Symmetric Encryption and Cryptanalysis
End-to-end cryptography is the most common technique used to nsure security in communication
systems [31]. In all of these algorithms, the transmitter Alice tries to transmit a message to the
receiver Bob, but meanwhile eavesdropper, called Eve, triesto obtain any knowledge about the
message. The cryptographic algorithm with an encryption key determines a number of mathemat-
ical operations applied over the original message called plaintext, to generate a ciphertext (also
called cryptogram). Since Bob is aware of the utilized key, hewill be able to decipher and obtain
the plaintext. Although it is often assumed that Eve knows the algorithm, decryption of the ci-
phertext to obtain the original message without knowing thekey is computationally infeasible for
her. Basically, there are two concepts of symmetric and asymmetric encryption in cryptography
field. In this Section we give an introduction about symmetric key encryption, and asymmetric
cryptography will be briefly discussed in Section 1.5.
1.4.1 Symmetric Encryption
A class of cryptography algorithms that use the same key to encipher the plaintext and decipher the
ciphertext are called symmetric key encryption. This secret key, denoted byk, used for enciphering
is indeed shared between Alice and Bob to keep a private information link. Alice enciphers the
plaintextm using the encryption algorithm denoted byE and generates the ciphertextc where
c = E(k,m), and then sendsc to Bob. Bob deciphers the receivedc using the shared keyk to
recover the plaintextm = D(k, c). It is assumed that encryption and decryption functionsE and
D are publicly known [32]. The encryption algorithm is designed in the sense that without knowing
the keyk, it is computationally infeasible to apply the decryption fu ctionD overc and obtain the
message. Symmetric encryption algorithms have the fastesthardware and software implementation
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among all encryption techniques. It makes them well suited for encryption of a large amount of
data. However, their main disadvantage is that they requirea s cure channel to exchange and
share secret keys. This can be resolved by using public key encr ption, that belongs to asymmetric
encryption class and are less efficient, or other existing secret key agreement algorithms that will
be discussed in Section 1.5. That is the main reason why symmetric and asymmetric encryptions
together provide a complete cryptosystem [32].
Symmetric encryption algorithms are divided into two majorcategories: stream ciphers and
block ciphers. Unlike block ciphers that use a deterministic function to encrypt fixed length of
plaintext, stream ciphers operate the encryption over a stre m of plaintext, and processes it charac-
ter by character while the encryption transformation and the length of the strings to be encrypted
vary by time. In hardware implementation, they are faster than block ciphers and have less com-
plexity [33]. Moreover, in situations that transmission noise is highly likely, stream ciphers are
more appropriate since they cause much less or no error propagation compared to block ciphers.
Due to these advantages stream ciphers are widely used in today’s cipher systems. Some impor-
tant stream ciphers include Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSRs) based stream ciphers, SEAL
(Software-optimized Encryption Algorithms) and RC4. Since in our work in [15] we used a spe-
cific block cipher for encryption and analysis, we dedicate as parate Section for block ciphers.
1.4.2 Block Ciphers and Cipher Feedback Mode of Operation
A block cipher is a symmetric key encryption algorithm withM = C = {0, 1}n, whereM is the
message space,C is the ciphertext space and with key spaceK = {0, 1}r:
E : {0, 1}r × {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}n, (k,m) 7−→ E(k,m). (1.10)
The encryption algorithmE encrypts the plaintext block with a fixed length ofn-bit by using the
secret keyk, to generate ciphertext blocksc with the same length ofn, wheren is called the block
length, andr is called the key length [32].
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The modern block ciphers are designed based on the notion of iterated product cipher. In his
seminal work [22], Shannon suggested to use product ciphersin which simple operations like sub-
stitutions and permutations are combined as a tool to effectively enhance security of the message.
In product ciphers, encryption is carried out in multiple rounds, where there exists an original key
out of which different sub-keys for each round are derived. The structure of Data Encryption stan-
dard (DES) as the most well-known symmetric block cipher, isba ed on iterated product cipher
in which each round involves a Feistel scheme [34]. This Feistel function includes expansion, key
mixing, substitution and permutation. DES and some recent realizations of block ciphers like Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) belong to the class of substit tion-permutation (SP) networks.
SP network is a product cipher which consists of multiple stages each involving substitutions and
permutations [33].
In DES cipher the substitution process in Feistel scheme is prformed by 8 substitution boxes (S-
boxes) that apply a non-linear transformation to their input bits based on a look-up table. S-boxes
are the only non-linear mapping in DES that provide the core security for this cipher without which
it would be easily breakable. S-boxes in block ciphers like DES and AES are designed in a way
that the required “Confusion and Diffusion" introduced by Shannon in 1940’s [22] is satisfied. It
requires that when one bit of the key or the input to the cipheris altered, decryption output will
have a burst of errors. This property is called avalanche effect [35].
DES was published by the U.S. National Bureau of Standards (now National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology, NIST) in 1977 as the first commercial-gr de modern cryptographic algo-
rithm. It has block length of64-bit and key length of64-bit where only56-bit of these are actually
used by the cipher as key bits. Due to the short key length thatDES has, it is now considered to be
insecure. In January 1999 it was publicly broken in a collabor tive work done by distributed.net and
Deep Crack within 22 hours and 15 minutes. Furthermore, becaus of some analytical weaknesses
that it has, it was withdrawn by NIST as a standard and now is superseded by AES [34]. Although
DES is replaced by AES, it is still being used and studied in some applications [36, 37] mostly in
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the form of Triple DES with three independent keys (168-bit key and 112-bit security) which is
believed to be secure in practice. Moreover, many general attacks against block ciphers like dif-
ferential and linear cryptanalysis were developed based onthe studies on DES cipher making it
the most studied and analyzed cipher. That is why we chose to use DES to investigate whether our
proposed secrecy system in [15] can remain sufficiently secure when it is used to enhance secrecy
of DES cipher which has well-known secrecy weaknesses.
After a 5 year competition, AES was selected to replace DES asa Federal standard and then
was adopted by NIST. It was submitted by two Belgian cryptographers, Joan Daemen and Vincent
Rijmen with the name ofRijndael, Daemen. AES algorithm [38, 39] is a symmetric block cipher
that can encrypt blocks of size 128-bits, by using cipher keys with different lengths of 128, 192
and 256-bits. This cipher operates on a4× 4 column major order matrix bytes, called the state.
By a block cipher, one can encrypt a single block of data with cip er’s block length. Using block
ciphers with modes of operation allows us to utilize them in asecure and repeated way. Modes of
operation are designed to derive a key stream from block ciphers like DES or AES. To encrypt a
variable length message, it must be divided into separate cipher blocks, such that the last block
must be extended to have the same length as the cipher block length by using a padding scheme.
Each of these blocks will be processed within the chain structu e of the operating mode which
applies randomization by using an initialization vector (IV) as an additional input [33]. The five
most common modes of operation for block ciphers are Electronic Codebook (ECB), Cipher-Block
Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), Output Feedback (OFB) and Counter Mode (CTR) [40].
In Chapter 2 we use CFB mode with block cipher of DES to analyze performance of a cipher
in our scheme. CFB mode is one of the operational modes that canbe used to transform a block
cipher like DES into a stream cipher which is widely used in many pplications [41, 42]. We
consider a simple case when the plaintext is partitioned into blocks with the size of cipher’s block.
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FIGURE 1.2. Cipher Feedback mode
Its structure is illustrated in Fig. 1.2. The operation in CFBcan be divided into three steps:
intialization: I1 = IV.
Encryption: Ii = ci−1, ci = Ek(Ii)⊕ pi,
Decryption: p′i = Ek(Ii)⊕ ci, (1.11)
Wherep′i is the stored plaintext or decryption output at timei. In this structure the ciphertext at
time i is used as input to the cipher at timei + 1, implying that the currently generated ciphertext
depends on both the current input and the previous ciphertext and consequently the preceding
plaintexts. When the block cipher is operated in CFB mode, it acts like a self synchronizing stream
cipher, meaning that when a block or a number of blocks are lost, after the same number of blocks
it can resynchronize itself and avoid further errors in decryption. Another property of CFB is
that encryption functionE is used both for encipherment and decipherment [33]. CFB causes
error propagation when a received ciphertext is noisy, thatwill be later discussed and analyzed in
Chapter 2.
1.4.3 Known Plaintext Attack and Linear Cryptanalysis
When the attacker has both samples of the plaintexts and theircorresponding ciphertexts, the attack
model for cryptanalysis is called the known-plaintext attack (KPA). Linear cryptanalysis is a KPA
which was first proposed by Matsui in [43] to attack DES. It is one of the most widely used attacks




which involves some input and output bits of the DES cipher and is used to obtain some key
bits [43]. The quantityε = |p− 1
2
|, which is called bias, measures the correlation among plaintext,
ciphertext and the key bits, and can be used as a criterion to distinguish the right key. Before attack,
Eve has to gather a large number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs by querying an oracle, and then for
each possible key value count the number of pairs that satisfy the linear equation. Since the bias
obtained by the right key will be considerably larger than the bias of a random key, attacker takes
the key value that maximizes the bias as the right key.
If we refer tom as the number of attacked key bits in linear cryptanalysis, the number of subkey
candidates would be2m that has to be sorted from rank1 to 2m based on their corresponding
probability bias. It should be noted that it is not necessarily lways true that the right key ranks the
highest, but it will be surely among high ranked candidates.Assume that adversary only checks
top2m−a candidates during exhaustive search, and since each subkeycandidate gets checked with
all possible combinations of56 −m remaining unattacked bits, Eve has to run exhaustive search
with at most256−m encryptions for each candidate. As a result, the total number of 56 key bits
examined in linear attack with bit advantagea is 256−a. In [44], A. Selçuk showed that when the
number of attacked key bitsm and the total number of gathered plaintext-ciphertext pairsN are
large enough, the probability of successPs, defined as the probability that the right key is among
256−a top candidates, can be derived as
Ps = Φ(2
√
Nε− Φ−1(1− 2−a−1)), (1.12)
wherea is the bit advantage of the attack,ε is the bias of the used linear approximation andΦ is





1.5 Secret Key Agreement
The main difficulty in symmetric encryption is that it requires identical keys to be transmitted and
shared between Alice, as a transmitter, and Bob, as a receiver, in a secure way before commu-
nication. in order to solve this problem Whitefiled Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976 proposed
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the principles of asymmetric encryption in [45] which is also called public-key encryption. In this
work they invented a key exchange protocol and revolutionized cryptography techniques. The first
real cryptographic algorithm for public key encryption wasdesigned by L. Rivest, K. Shamir, and
L. Adleman at MIT, and was named RSA as the initial letters of its three inventors [46].
In public-key-encryption, the same key is not used for encryption and decryption, and therefore
there is no need to share the same key between them. It works inthis way that initially each user
generates a pair of keys, one as a public encryption-key which is widely distributed and every
user is aware of it, and one as a private-decryption-key thatis known only to the recipient. The
transmitter and every user can encrypt the message using thepublic key of the recipient while
only the intended recipient can decrypt the ciphertext withh s private key. These keys are mathe-
matically related but are designed such that finding the private key from the known public key is
computationally infeasible.
Since most of the public-key-encryption algorithms require randomly generating large prime
numbers, which is computationally inefficient and slow, they are mainly used to communicate se-
cret keys, and then Alice and Bob can use the shared keys in their fast computable symmetric
encryption algorithms for secure communication. However,the existing computational as well as
power constraints in some applications like wireless devices make public-key-encryption unfavor-
able for them. As a result, there is a need to present low complexity schemes that can handle key
management problem. We try to deal with the problem in Chapter3.
1.5.1 Physical Layer Based Secret key Sharing
The idea that physical channel characteristics can be utilized to enhance secrecy goes back to
Wyner’s work in [1] that was discussed in Section 1.3. However, Wyner’s degraded wiretap chan-
nel was described to be unrealistic by Maurrer in his seminalwork [2]. In this paper he presented an
information theoretic based key agreement scheme with a two-way channel model that is publicly
observable in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. His strategy is based on correlated random-
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ness and public discussion. Its key elements are outcomes ofthe information reconciliation and
privacy amplification procedures.
In reconciliation step both terminals come up with a randomly generated body of data that is
identical between them through exploiting public discussion channel. This common random se-
quence that is agreed by two parties will be used to extract secret keys by privacy amplification.
Although the correlated randomness may be partially known by Eve, privacy amplification reduces
it into a shorter length sequence, that has a uniformly random istribution given Eve’s information
implying that she can gain almost no knowledge about it. Advantage of this scheme over Wyner’s
is that in certain cases it works even if Eve has a less noisy channel. Due to importance of privacy
amplification we dedicate the whole Section 1.6 to discuss about it.
Maurrer defined secret key rate as the maximal achievable rate at which secret key can be gen-
erated by legitimate partners about which an eavesdropper has virtually no knowledge. In other
words, secret key rate is the maximal rate at which Alice and Bob, by communicating over an au-
thentic but insecure public channel, can generate secret keys in a way that Eve obtains knowledge
about the shared key at an arbitrarily small rate [2].
Since Maurrer’s scheme does not involve any complex computations of prime number genera-
tion, as does public-key-encryption, it offers a more efficient solution to secret key sharing prob-
lems. In a related work by Ahlswede and Csizar [47], the problem of secret-key sharing based
on the generated common randomness is studied, and the concept of key capacity is defined. In
[48], Csiszar and Narayan derived secret key capacity when a hlper supplies additional correlated
information for Alice and Bob. They characterized single-letter key-based capacities when there
exist arbitrary number of terminals in [49]. The problem of physical layer secret key sharing stud-
ied in [2] was extended by Maurrer and Wolf in [13] to active adversary scenario when adversary,
in addition to just eavesdropping, can actively interact with legitimate parties or even tamper with
legitimate communications. In this work, they showed that secret key can be agreed at the same
rate as the passive eavesdropper scenario or such a secret key sharing protocol is infeasible.
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The next evolution in physical-layer-based secret key sharing was exploitation of inherent com-
mon randomness in wireless communication channels. One of the first examples of such tech-
niques was proposed by Koorapaty et.al [14], in which based on the independence of channels
of Alice/Bob and Alice/Eve, the secret key was extracted fromthe phase of fading coefficients.
Since then there have been numerous techniques that utilized the randomness inherent in wireless
channels for key generation [50], [51], [52]. There are alsosome other techniques like [53], [54]
that utilized the well known ARQ protocol to facilitate exchange of secret keys between Alice and
Bob. Our proposed scheme in [16], to be discussed in Chapter 3, is another application of ARQ
mechanism to establish secret keys.
1.6 Privacy Amplification
Privacy amplification is a technique to distill highly secret shared information, from a large body
of common information which is only partially secure. Suppose that legitimate users share a string
X = Y = S, about which, however adversary has possibly some information. Privacy amplifica-
tion is the art of transforming this partially secret stringto a virtually secret keŷS about which
Eve can only obtain arbitrary little information.
First described in the context of quantum key agreement, privacy amplification was generalized
by Bennett et.al in [55] to probabilistic information aboutS. They showed that when from Eve’s
perspective the length of̂S is approximately equal to the Rényi entropy ofS, we can make sure
that she can only attain a negligible knowledge aboutŜ. This privacy amplification technique is
based on universal hashing. Another technique that is currently used for privacy amplification is
based on random extractors [56], [57].
1.6.1 Universal Class of Hash Functions
Among all techniques for privacy amplification, universal hs ing is a well-known approach against
deterministic eavesdropping [55]. A class of hash functions that maps an-bit binary string into
a r-bit string is universal if the collision probability for two distinct inputs is2−r [55]. Universal
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hashing has this property that by uniform-randomly choosing a function from a universal class of
hash functions, regardless of what distribution the actualinput has, for sufficiently short output,
the expected hash output will have a distribution close to uniform which results in the maximum
entropy.
Let X be a random variable with distribution ofPX . The collision probabilityPc(X) is the






The Rènyi entropy of order 2 ofX is also called collision entropy since it can be written as the
negative logarithm of the collision probability:
H2(X) = − log2 Pc(X) (1.14)




PY (y)H2(X|Y = y) (1.15)
The following bound provided by Bennett et.al in [55] (as Corollary 4), describes how Eve’s colli-
sion entropy about a created randomnessW conditioned on her observed datav limits her knowl-
edge regarding output of universal hashing function applied overW :
Lemma 1. LetPVW denote an arbitrary probability distribution wherev is a realization of random
variableV observed by Eve. LetG be uniform randomly chosen function from a universal class of
hash functions fromW to {0, 1}r, when Alice and Bob chooseK = G(W ) as their secure key, If
Eve’s collision entropyH2(W |V = v) aboutW is lower-bounded byc, we will have
H(K|G, V = v) ≥ r − log2(1 + 2r−c) ≥ r −
2r−c
ln 2
Thus, whenr < c, Eve’s uncertainty about the secret keyK is close to maximum valuer as the
entropy of the uniform distribution, and her information about this keyK will be arbitrarily small.
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For our analysis in Chapter 3 we use the following lemma, proven in [55] as Corollary 4 which is
derived from Lemma 1:
Lemma 2. LetW denote a randomn − bit string with uniform distribution over{0, 1}n, for an
arbitrary eavesdropping functione : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}t, and letV = e(W ). let s < n − t be a
positive safety parameter, for somet < n, and letr = n−t−s. If Alice and Bob selectK = G(W )
as their secret key whereG is chosen randomly from a universal class of hash functions from
{0, 1}n to {0, 1}r, then Eve’s expected knowledge about the secret key givenG a dV , satisfies
I(K,GV ) ≤ 2−s/ ln 2.
Roughly speaking universal hashing extracts the minimum collision entropy of the weakly ran-
dom sourceW into the secret stringK, in the sense that the knowledge of Eve aboutK would be
upper-bounded by2−s/ ln 2 wheres is the security parameter.
Hayashi in [58] showed that when input has sufficient entropyin terms of Rényi entropy of
order1 + α, for α > 0, after application of universal hash function, Eve’s information about the
generated random variable decreases at an exponential ratethat can be lower-bounded. The bound
provided by Hayashi is more generalized and in some cases even tighter than the bound obtained
by Bennett in [55]. It is the basis of our analysis in Chapter 4.
1.6.2 Randomness Extractors
Although universal classes are more economic compared to other functions, one limitation that
these functions have is that they require a description as long as the string that forms their input.
Extractors, as another technique for privacy amplification, allow us to more efficiently extract the
randomness of some weakly random source into entirely random data, by using a small additional
number of perfectly random bits called catalyst or seed, in asense that these bits reappear as a part
of the almost uniformly generated output [56]. Due to their efficiency, extractors have attracted
lots of attention and intensely studies in recent years [57], [59], [60]. A formal definition of a
randomness extractor according to [56] is as follows:
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Definition 1. A functionExt : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}d −→ {0, 1}r is called a(δ, ε) extractor if for
any random variableX with rangeX ⊆ {0, 1}N , and min-entropyH∞(X) ≥ δN , the variational
distance of the distribution of[S,Ext(X,S)] to the uniform distribution over{0, 1}d+r is at most
ε whenS is independent ofX and uniformly distributed in{0, 1}d.
As stated in their definition, extractors distill virtuallyall the min-entropy out of a weakly-
random sourceX , thereby requiring only a small number of truly-random bitsS from the set
{0, 1}d. This definition not only requires that the length of the extrac or output is approximately
equal to the min-entropy of the source plus the number of random bits, but that these bits even
reappear as a part of the output. The following theorem proven in [56] measures the entropy of the
adversary given her knowledge about the random bitsS when an extractor is used for distilling
randomness.
Theorem 1. Let δ,∆1,∆2 > 0 be constants. Then, there exists for all sufficiently largeN , a
functionExt : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}d −→ {0, 1}r, whered ≤ ∆1N andr ≥ (δ −∆2)N , such that for
all random variablesX withX ⊆ {0, 1}N andH∞(X) > δN we have
H(Ext(X,S)|S) ≥ r − 2−N1/2−o(1) (1.16)
As Eq. (1.16) implies, when min-entropyH∞ is at least a fraction of the length of the source
X, for sufficiently largeN , the second term in upper bound of the entropy goes to zero, thereby
maximizing Eve’s uncertainty about the extracted output given her knowledge.
Most of the recent research on extractors has focused on the ex raction of secure keys from
discrete noisy sources [59]. Fuzzy extractor is the basic primitive resulted from this work that
allows to extract a secure cryptographic key from a noisy source. It consists basically of two phases.
In the first phase that is called enrollment, by using probabilistic procedures a secure key and a
helper string will be extracted from an original random source. The helper string is truly random
and has to be considered as publicly available and hence attacker can observe it. The receiver
receives a noisy version of the original source whose distance from it is less than a determined
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threshold. In the second phase which is called reconstruction phase the receiver will recover the
original source from noisy data by using the helper and then extracts the secure key out of it.
In other words, the reconstruction phase takes input as the noisy received data and the helper to
reconstruct the original key.
Fuzzy extractor combines two functionalities, information reconciliation (also called error cor-
rection) and privacy amplification (ensuring that eavesdropper has negligible knowledge about the
key). It was noted in [59] that a fuzzy extractor can in general be built upon two primitives: a
secure sketch and a strong extractor. The secure sketch partmakes it possible to exactly recon-
struct the original source from the public helper string andthe noisy received data. The strong
extractor extracts the secret key from the reconstructed source. In [60], Ishai et.al. introduces the
notion of correlation extractors as a generalization of randomness extraction and related the no-
tion of privacy amplification to the case of two correlated sources. Correlation extractors extract
nearly perfect instances of a given joint distribution fromimperfect, or leaky, instances of the same
distribution.
In Chapter 4, we introduce a new notion of Rényi entropy extractors that extracts randomness in
terms of Rényi entropy which is generalization of the currentextractors that measure randomness
on the basis of min-entropy and statistical distance.
1.7 Secrecy Metrics
Consider a security function (like an encryption)E : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c that is applied over input
M to generate the outputE(M). What Eve receives through her channel ChA: {0, 1}c → {0, 1}d
is Z = ChA(E(M). The security that this function provides with respect to anadversary can
be measured using secrecy metrics. Secrecy metric xs denoteby Advxs(E ,ChA) measures the
amount of information about messageM that is present inZ. The smaller this number, the more
securityE is able to deliver. Some examples of secrecy metrics are semantic security, distinguishing
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security, mutual information and adversary success rate ordec yptment error probability. In this
chapter we discuss the last three that are relevant to the accomplished works in this dissertation.
1.7.1 Mutual Information Security
The secrecy condition that Wyner used in [1] was thatlimn→∞ I(M ;ChA(E(M)))/m = 0 wheren
can be considered as the number of channel uses or a parameterthat bothm andc are functions of it.
Wyner assumes that messageM is uniformly distributed over{0, 1}m. It was criticized by Maurer
in [61] who proposed a stronger notion of secrecy condition which islimn→∞ I(M ;ChA(E(M))) =
0 with the remaining assumption of having a message with uniform distribution. This secrecy con-
dition put forth by Maurer is equivalent to saying thatH(M |Z) also called equivocation moves
to H(M) for largen. Namely, knowingZ does not reduce Eve’s uncertainty about the message.
Since then mutual information between Alice and Eve’s variables has been adopted as a measure
of information leakage and secrecy criterion in many works by information theory community
[1, 9, 47].
Bellare et.al. in [3] named this secrecy metric that was adopted by Wyner and Maurer as mutual
information for random messages (Mis-r). He denoted it byAdvmis−r(E ,ChA) = I(M ;ChA(E(M)))
for it is defined for uniformly random messageM . However, from cryptography point of view this
metric is weak since we know that real messages are not uniformly distributed. They maybe En-
glish text, votes, scores of an exam that are not necessarilyuniform messages. Namely, Mis-r can
not ensure security for these types of data that have rise in applic tions of cryptography. In cryp-
tography community the independence from message distribution has been viewed important for a
good definition. Although it is argued in information theorycommunity that message can be com-
pressed before encryption, we should note that lossless compression is a deterministic operation
that does not change entropy. Moreover, no universally source independent compression exists for
finitely long messages [62].
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In [3, 4], Bellare suggests using a stronger notion of secrecycalled mutual informations security
(MIS) defined as
Advmis(E ;ChA) = max
M
I(M ;ChA(E(M))), (1.17)
with maximization over all distributions ofM over{0, 1}m. WhenAdvmis is negligible, it ensures
that the required security will be achieved regardless of how messages are distributed. It provides
the required message distribution independence for security. In Chapter 4 we use mutual informa-
tion between Eve’s information and the message source as thesecr cy criterion and require it to be
negligible for any given distribution of the input. Thus, our defined secrecy metric can also capture
distributions that arise in cryptographic applications.
1.7.2 Eve’s distinguishability
Although MIS is a strong secrecy metric, its underlying intution is somewhat obscure for cryp-
tographers. They have very different approaches and intuition. Bellare in [3, 4] defines two other
metrics that more conform with cryptographic approaches that are Semantic Security (SS) and
Distinguishing Security (DS). Here we discuss DS.
Advantage of Eve’s distinguishability or distinguishing security (DS) is defined as
Advds(E ;ChA) = max
A,M0,M1




whereb is a random variable uniformly distributed on{0, 1} andSD denotes the statistical dis-
tance which is half of theL1 distance. The maximization is over all messagesM0,M1 as strings in
{0, 1}m and all adversariesA. Pr[A(M0,M1,ChA(E(Mb))) = b] is the probability that adversary
A, givenm-bit messagesM0,M1, and the ciphertext resulted fromMb, is able to correctly identify
the random challenge bitb. The advantage is defined as how success probability of adversary in
distinguishing bitb differs from a priori success probability of1
2
. As Eq. (1.18) indicates this advan-
tage is equivalent to statistical distance between random variables ChA(E(M0)) and ChA(E(M1)).
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Distinguishability security based on statistical distance was also adopted by Canetti in [7] as
a universally composable secrecy metric. In seeking for a general methodology for expressing
security requirements in any protocol environment, they proposed using variational distance or
Eve’s distinguishability to evaluate information leakagebased on half ofL1 norm distance. Hayashi
in [63] presents secrecy exponent analysis based on this metric. Variational distance is a metric
that given Eve’s knowledge measures statistical distance of the secret message from a uniformly
generated random message over the same alphabet set. This metric will be analyzed in Chapter 4
where we compare it with the metric based on mutual information. Our analysis shows that mutual
information is a slightly stronger metric compared to variational distance. However, variational
distance is more compatible with cryptographic approachesand can be used to evaluate secrecy of
any cryptographic protocol that brings about its main advantage which is universal composability.
1.7.3 Attack Success Rate or Eve’s Error Probability
Cryptanalysis success probability has been used as a widespread secrecy criterion in cryptography
community [43, 44, 64, 65]. In traditional and more strict definition of success rate it refers to the
probability that the right candidate is found as the first keyamong sorted ones in the first phase
of cryptanalysis [64, 65]. Selçuk in [44] proposed a new definitio for success in attack in the
sense that the correct key is found not necessarily as the highest-ranking candidate but among a
set of high-ranking ones. In this analysis he provided formulas for direct calculation of the success
probability of linear and differential cryptanalysis. We discussed his approach of analysis for linear
attack in more details in Section 1.4.
If we consider a more general model for cipher where its type and the approach for cryptanal-
ysis are not specified, success rate of the attack can be interpret d as the probability of correct
decryptment [66, 67] or attack error probability [68]. Works in [66–68] consider Additive-Like
Instantaneous Block (ALIB) cipher that has an additive-like function as a combiner of the message
input and the key stream. In fact, they view cipher as a communication system encoder, whose code
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rate is the rate of key stream generation from a cipher key, and the cryptanalyst as the communi-
cation decoder. They try to choose a key rate and a cipher to make it improbable for the attacker
to deduce any significant portion of the message. In other words, their objective is to design a bad
code acting like a good cipher that results in a high probability of error for the decoder which is
adversary [68].
Consider a sequence ofn message blocks denoted byM1,M2, . . . ,Mn. Let cryptanalyst esti-
mation of this sequence beM∗1 ,M
∗
2 , . . . ,M
∗
n. Average probability of correct decryptment for this








Similarly error probability of cryptanalysis will be1 − pb. The designer attempts to makepb and
the key rate as small as possible. However, this secrecy criterion is relatively weak compared to
other metrics like Eve’s distinguishability or mutual information. First of all, since it quantifies
error probability averaged over a large number of events, even for a very low success probability
there could occur some rare events when Eve successfully decr pts the message and obtains the
required information. Moreover, based on Fanos’ lemma [18], a function of error probability pro-
vides an upper-bound for equivocation (Eve’s uncertainty about the message given her knowledge)
implying that high equivocation ensures a high error probability but not the other way around.
Namely, mutual information and equivocation are much stronger secrecy metrics compared to
average cryptanalysis error probability. Nevertheless, error probability gives a more intuitive un-
derstanding of performance of a cipher system. For instance, i Chapter 4 we adopt Eve’s error
probability of estimation of the plaintext as the secrecy criterion for the cipher that guarantees a
primitive secrecy as the baseline to achieve a higher level of secrecy.
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Chapter 2
Enhancement of Secrecy of Block Ciphered Systems 
by Deliberate Noise
In this chapter based on our work in [15], we consider the problem of end-to-end security en-
hancement by resorting to deliberate noise injected in ciphertexts. The main goal is to generate a
degraded wiretap channel in application layer over which Wyner-type secrecy encoding is invoked
to deliver additional secure information. More specifically, we study secrecy enhancement of DES
block cipher working in cipher feedback model (CFB) when adjustable noise is introduced into en-
crypted data in application layer. A verification strategy in exhaustive search step of linear attack is
designed to allow Eve to mount a successful attack in the noisy environment. Thus, a controllable
wiretap channel is created over multiple frames by taking advantage of errors in Eve’s cryptanaly-
sis, whose secrecy capacity is found for the case of known channel states at receivers. As a result,
additional secure information can be delivered by performing Wyner type secrecy encoding over
super-frames ahead of encryption. These secrecy bits could be taken as symmetric keys for up-
coming frames. Numerical results indicate that a sufficiently large secrecy rate can be achieved by
selective noise addition.
2.1 Introduction
Traditionally, end-to-end secrecy delivery relies on symmetric or asymmetric encryption residing
in the upper layer of a communication system, as well as sophisticated key management schemes
[31, 69]. Without requiring a secure cipher, Wyner-type secrecy encoding provides a completely
different solution to link-wise secret message delivery by random binning tailored to some pre-
sumed wiretap channel models in physical layer [1, 9]. In this chapter, we propose an encoding-
encryption approach to end-to-end secrecy delivery by encoding over a degraded wiretap channel
across super-frames transmitted in the application layer. The resulting wiretap channel is created
by injecting controllable noise into ciphertext after encryption, and determined by both the adver-
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sary node’s uncertainty about the key of cipher and its limited resources in launching cryptanalysis.
Secrete information transmitted in such manner could be takn s keys for the subsequent super-
frame.
In the proposed framework, we are essentially exploring thetechniques developed for physical
layer secrecy encoding and cryptanalysis against symmetric block ciphers to serve our purpose of
realizing end-to-end secrecy enhancement without resorting to exogenous physical channel condi-
tions. More specifically, Data Encryption Standard (DES) block cipher working in Cipher Feed-
back Mode (CFB) is taken to encrypt messages encoded using the Wyn r type secrecy encoding
scheme and then transmitted over multiple frames encryptedusing different keys. Random binary
noise is then deliberately added onto ciphertext, which arerec ived by both legitimate user and
an eavesdropper without any additional distortion. Such a hierarchical encoding-encryption frame-
work allows us to transmit secrete messages over the resulting degraded wiretap channels in the
application layer without making any assumption regardinge d-to-end physical channel condi-
tions.
In order to analyze secrecy enhancement achieved by utilizing our encoding-then-encryption
approach, we need to study how Eve responds to the existing nose in her gathered data, and how
that influences her cryptanalysis performance. In our case,Ev attempts to mount her linear attack
with accumulated noisy ciphertexts, and thus applies a new verification strategy in the second phase
of the linear attack while considering her possible resource constraints. Our statistical analysis
shows that even when she uses a numerically optimized attacking strategy to obtain the key, it is
likely for her to make mistakes in cryptanalysis. These possible failures of Eve over multiple frames
make her channel degraded than the main channel, which can befurth r exploited by secrecy
encoder to send additional secret bits over a super-frame. Th refore we could utilize generated
secret bits over the last super-frame, whose secrecy is ensured by Wyner-type secrecy encoding
scheme, to establish keys for next coming frames. The secrecy apacity of the system is computed
assuming known channel states at Bob and Eve. Numerical results illustrate how deliberately added
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noise influences secrecy rate which can be further maximizedat certain noise rate. It should be
noted that the primary goal of our work is to demonstrate through such a case-study how secrecy
encoding and symmetric encryption could be put together to enhance end-to-end security, and thus
we only provide capacity computation of the resulting channel towards the end without dealing
with the implementation of a particular secrecy encoder [28].
In literature, very few analytical approaches have focusedon the impact of noisy ciphertexts on
the attacking performance. In [70] different security schemes are analyzed from both reliability
and secrecy perspectives in the presence of channel noise; nn theless, they do not discuss what
modified strategy Eve needs to take adaptively against degraation, and nor have they considered
further leveraging adversary’s failures in its cryptanalysis. In fact, our approach shares a common
spirit with friendly jamming schemes proposed in physical layer secrecy encoding [71, 72] where
deliberate noise is introduced in physical layer to interfere both legitimate link and eavesdropped
link to improve the secrecy rate region. Unlike these works where link-wise physical channel fea-
tures are explored to create a degraded wiretap channel, we essentially explore the adversary’s
disadvantages due to its uncertainty about the secrete key bits and resulting deteriorated success
rate in cryptanalysis in the presence of deliberate noise.
In addition, deliberate additive noise in encryption process was used to improve security of ci-
phers in previous works [73–75]. The primary goals in these works were to enhance the secrecy
of a cipher by random binning and additive noise, but we are int rested in deploying encoding-
then-encryption framework to enhance secrecy by further encodi g over a resulting degraded
wiretap channel. Random measurement noise has also been considered in side channel attacks
(SCA) where information about cryptographic operation is leaked through some physical measure-
ments conducted by an adversary [76]. In [77], authors proposed to use multi-linear approximation
utilized in Differential Power Analysis (DPA)-like attacks, which is powerful due its robustness
against noise.
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The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2 the proposed security scheme is described,
and in 2.3, we design an optimized verification strategy for Eve. In section 2.4 the main and wire-
tap channels are modeled, and then the resulting secrecy capacity is computed in section 2.5. The
numerical results are presented in section 2.6, and finally we conclude this chapter in section 2.7.
2.2 The proposed scheme for security system
Fig. 2.1 illustrates the proposed scheme for secrecy improvement in which after encryption of the
original messageS, intentional noise is injected into it to generate a degraded wiretap channel.
Since we consider end-to-end secrecy, physical channel is assumed to be error-free. Therefore,
the ciphertexts that Bob obtains only include errors caused by intentional noise introduced into
encrypted data in application layer with bit error rate ofη. Moreover, because Alice and Bob agree
on the key used for the current data frame, Bob can decrypt the obtained noisy ciphertexts and
then apply the wiretap channel decoding algorithm that allows him to recover the original message
Ŝ with arbitrarily small error probability. As indicated in Fig. 2.1, there exists an oracle, whereby
Eve can query and obtain consecutive plaintext/ciphertextpairs. However, due to the deliberate
noise, it provides Eve with noisy ciphertexts distorted with independent errors of rateη. As the
main advantage over Eve, Alice and Bob share the same encryption and decryption key which is
unknown to Eve. Therefore, she has to adopt an attack strategy that can exploit the gathered noisy
data in order to guess the secret key.
We assume that legitimate users initialize with a shared setof keys in a highly secure manner
at the beginning. As a result, Alice can divide the whole datain o equal size data frames, each
includingM number of data blocks of size64-bit which is the block size used in CFB mode. In
this way, the same key will be used forM 64-bit blocks in each frame for encryption and decryption
at the receiver end. In this chapter, we show that due to Eve’sresource constraints, it is likely for
her to make mistakes in assessing a frame key. As a result, Eve’s channel is a degraded version
of the main channel. We can leverage this advantage by applying Wyner secrecy encoding over
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FIGURE 2.1. The proposed security scheme based on the intentional noise
super-frames to average over all possible failures by Eve. In Wyner-type encoder redundancy is
added to correct errors that occur across the main channel, and randomness is added for keeping
Eve ignorant across the wiretap channel [1], [28].
Another issue is key scheduling problem to provide highly confidential and distinctive keys for
each frame while Bob is fully aware of them. The traditional methods of key management like
master/session key scheduling approaches [31, 69] are sophisticated and costly. Here, we propose
a simpler technique that derives the required secrecy for frame keys from secret bits delivered by
Wyner secrecy encoder over the created wiretap channel. As are ult, since encoder is performed
over each super-frame, Alice can use input to the encoder to extract frame keys in next super-
frame, for instance by applying a universal class of Hash functio s over it [55]. Bob is able to
decode encrypted data and obtain the encoded message, and thus he will be able to derive keys for
next frames.
2.3 Eve’s attack strategy and its analysis
This section studies the effect of the channel degradation on the performance of the linear crypt-
analysis in terms of Eve’s success rate. Since linear cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack, Eve
has to rely on the received plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Dueto the existing errors in these cipher-
texts, when Eve examines a key, she is unable to distinguish between errors caused by the received
noisy ciphertext and the ones induced by using the wrong key.Thus, she needs to design a new
verification approach that gives her the maximum possible success rate in finding the right key.
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2.3.1 Designed Verification Strategy for Attack
Consider ciphertexts go through a binary symmetric channel whose cross-over probability isη.
Let Cn be the ciphertext block at timen. After it passes through channel and Xors with channel
noise, the received noisy64-bit ciphertextĈn will have error with the probability of1− (1− η)64.
Therefore, Eve can not rely only on two successive ciphertexts to check the correctness of a key,
because they might have errors that can lead her to make mistakes. Indeed, Eve has to try a number
of successive pairs, using CFB mode in order to increase her succe s rate.
In Fig. 2.2, two consecutive stages of CFB that are used to check t key are shown, wherePi
andĈi are respectively the plaintext and ciphertext for theith stage,Si is the encrypted result of
Ĉi−1 that after Xor withPi generateŝChi . Provided that the used key is correct,Ĉ
h
i must be the
same aŝCi, but due to the possible errors in̂Ci or Ĉi−1 there might be some differences between
them. Hence, Hamming Weight (HW) of Xor of̂Chi andĈi denoted byEi must be compared with
a threshold denoted asτ . Then, a key trial for theith stage can be considered successful if this HW
is less thanτ .
Note that at stagei when there is an error either in the input to the cipher, i.e.Ĉi−1 or in the key,
there will be burst of errors inSi, which makesĈhi totally different and in special case ofα = 0.5
independent from̂Ci. Therefore, by choosing a small value for thresholdτ and comparing HW of
Ĉhi ⊕ Ĉi, Eve can know that either input to the cipher or the key is noisy. In Table 2.1, the key
verification strategy for Eve is given that she needs to follow in the brute-force attack phase of
linear cryptanalysis to test the correctness of the examined keyki. In this strategy, Eve examines
each key candidateNc times withNc consecutive pairs whereNc is chosen such that with a high
probability at least in one trial out ofNc tests, input to the cipher has no error. Then, Eve can
recognize the correct key when at least one of trials is successful.
Since when the examined key is correct andĈi−1 is error-free, all the discrepancies betweenĈhi
and Ĉi will be caused by the possible errors in̂Ci, we can determine the minimum value forτ
such that the probability that the number of bit errors inĈi exceedsτ denoted byPfault becomes
33
TABLE 2.1. Verification strategy
1- PickNc number of consecutive pairs.
2- TryNc chosen pairs overNc chained CFB stages using the keyki.
3- A trial is successful ifHW (Ei = Ĉi ⊕ Ĉhi ) ≤ τ .
4- If there exists at least one successful event out ofNc trials,
ki is the correct key, otherwise it is wrong.











In the next step, we need to find the optimum value forNc. LetKh0 be the hypothesis when the
examined key is wrong andKh1 when it is right. Then, letAi be a random variable whereAi = 1
defines successful trial at theith stage that happens when HW ofEi is less or equal toτ , andAi = 0
otherwise. By proper selection ofτ , we can make sure that whenever there is no error in the input
to the cipher, Eve can recognize the right key. Thus, probability of success event is
P1 = Pr[Ai = 1|Kh1 ] = P [Ĉi−1is error-free] = (1− η)64. (2.2)
Eve misses the right key when allNc trials fail that has the probability of
Pm = (1− P1)Nc , (2.3)
We callPm key missing probability. Thus, we need to find minimumNc such that keepsPm below
a threshold likeTm.
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Now we need to compute the probability that Eve mistakenly admits a wrong key while exam-
ining a single candidate. When the used key is wrong due to the avalanche effect,̂Chi will have bit
error rate ofα, that after Xor withĈi with bit error probability ofη, results in output bit error rate
of γ as
γ = α(1− η) + η(1− α). (2.4)
Since to admit a wrong key at theith stage as the right one, HW ofEi must be less thanτ , the
probability of a successful trial at this stage for a wrong key is









On the other hand, Eve accepts a wrong key when there happens at l a t one successful trial for
it. Thus, the false key probability for a single candidate is
PF = 1− (1− P2)Nc , (2.6)
Even though this probability seems negligible, it gets aggre ated over a large number of examined
wrong key candidates, and can result in a non-negligible false key probability, as will be seen in
simulations.
2.3.2 Analysis of the Designed Attack Strategy for Eve
In [70] Yin et. al. showed that in noisy environment with bit error rate ofη, for linear attack on
DES cipher, the probability bias of the new linear equation de oted byε̂, as well as the success
probability of attackerPs can be computed based on the linear probability bias of the original linear
equationε and the number of obtained pairs by EveN as
Ps = Φ(2
√
Nε̂− Φ−1(1− 2−a−1)), where ε̂ = 2u+v(1− η − 0.5)u+vε. (2.7)
If adversary uses the improved linear analysis technique, she needs to use Matsui’s linear equation
for DES that requiresu bits of plaintext andv bits of corresponding ciphertext whereu + v = 26
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to guessm = 26 key bits [64]. As discussed in section 1.4, in linear attack with bit advantage of
a, the total number of examined keys is256−a. If the ciphertexts that Eve obtains are error-free,
her success probability will bePs which is the probability that the correct key is among top256−a
examined candidates. For the case that obtained ciphertexts are erroneous, the following theorem
proven in Appendix 6.1 quantifies the probability that Eve obtains the correct key, fails to get any
key and obligatorily drops the whole frame or gets a wrong key.
Theorem 2. Consider a linear attack with bit advantage ofa. Assume Eve’s obtained ciphertexts
contain bit errors with the rate ofη, and that she uses the designed strategy in brute-force stepof




[1− (1− PF )2
56−a
] ≈ Ps(1− Pm), (2.8)
wherePm, PF andPs are given in Eq.’s (2.3), (2.6) and (2.7). On the other hand, frame erasure
probability will be
Pe = (1− Ps)(1− PF )2
56−a
+ PsPm(1− PF )(2
56−a−1)
≈ [1− 256−aPF ][1− (1− Pm)Ps]. (2.9)
In addition, the probability that Eve accepts a wrong key denot d byPw can be derived asPw =
1− Pc − Pe.
Conclusively, we showed that there is possibility that Eve isnot able to obtain any key, or to
falsely accepts a wrong key.
2.3.3 Restriction on Eve’s Resources
In our secrecy analysis we consider Eve to be restricted in resources with a limited computational
capability. In fact, the basis of analysis is that without any restriction, an unbounded adversary
would be eventually able to obtain the correct key by examining all possible keys with as many as
possible trials. However, when there is a limit on the numberof evaluations that Eve can perform
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or on the number of pairs that she can obtain, she has to restrict the number of key evaluations that
consequently impacts her success rate. We assume that advers ry is bounded and can not perform
more thanθ DES evaluations that limits her computational capability.
We also put restriction on the total number of pairs that Eve can use in her cryptanalysis. Let
us first consider the scenario where Eve has to gather all these N required number of pairs in
her attack from the transmitted data frame throughout whichthe same key is used for encryption.
Now, the question is that for a typical communication link what size this frame needs to have, and
how long it takes for Eve in order to accumulate these many pairs? For special case study let us
assume that Eve requiresN = 246 number of pairs to mount her attack in noisy environment with
acceptable success rate. We should note that since according to Eq. (2.7), bias probability for noisy
case withη > 0 denoted bŷε is less than the bias for error-free case indicated byε, to have the
same success probability in noisy environment as in the error-free case a higher number of pairs
would be required.
First of all, we consider known plaintext attack. Since communication overhead is publicly
known, Eve seeks to gather her required number of pairs from these transmitted overhead as plain-
text blocks whose corresponding ciphertexts are received.For special case study we consider In-
ternet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) which is a widely deployed protocol that routes most of the traffic
in Internet [78]. Considering TCP data transmission, for every payload of 1500 bytes, there will be
20 bytes added IPv4 header and 20 bytes TCP header, i.e. headerrate is approximatelyhr = 2.6%.
In other words, in known plaintext attack 2.6% of the transmitted packets can be used by attacker
to gather her required plaintext/ciphertext pairs. If we consider the plaintext and ciphertext size
as the block size in CFB mode with DES cipher which isl = 64 bit, there have to be in total
L = Nl/hr = 1.73× 1017 number of transmitted bits to allow Eve gatherN = 246 pairs. For data
speed of 100 Mbps, the total amount of time that is required toreceiveL number of bits by Eve
is T = 481153.8 hours that amounts to 20048 days assuming that all transmitted data is encrypted
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using the same key. We can see that for known plaintext attackEve requires a tremendous amount
of time to gather her required pairs from a continuously transmitted frame.
For known ciphertext attack Eve only requires to gather all received ciphertexts that are en-
crypted blocks from the same data frame. Assuming that she requiresN = 246 number of64-bit
ciphertext blocks, for data rate of 100 Mbps the total required time would be 12510 hours equiva-
lent to 521 days. It implies that for both known plaintext andciphertext attacks, for Eve to gather
the required number of pairs in her attack from the transmitted data frame, a huge amount of time
is required which is unrealistic. That is why we consider theworst case scenario and assume that
there exists a virtual oracle providing Eve with the required number of pairs prior to her attack. In
our analysis the maximum number of noisy pairs that Eve is allowed to accumulate is denoted by
Nmax.
2.3.4 Parameter Optimization of Adversary’s Attack Strategy
Eave’s objective is to mount a successful attack, and in order to achieve this goal, she maximizes
the success probability of the utilized linear attack denotd byPc, given in (2.8), knowing that her
computational ability is restricted toθ DES encryptions, and there is a constraint on the number of
plaintext/ciphertext pairs that she can accumulate. In linear cryptanalysis with modified exhaustive
search phase for noisy environment, Eve runs at mostNc256−a DES encryptions, which due to her
computational constraints, can not exceedθ. Moreover, we assume that prior to mounting attack
on a frame of data, a virtual oracle provides Eve with as many number of pairs as her data storage
capability allows denoted byNmax. As a result, she needs to design attack parameters includingNc,
τ anda, to maximize the overall success probability subject to these constraints
max
Nc,τ,a
Pc subject toθ ≥ Nc.256−a, N ≤ Nmax. (2.10)
From Eq. (2.8) we can see that to maximizePc we need to minimizePm andPF . Since according
to Eq. (2.3),Pm mainly depends onNc, we can define thresholdTm and find the minimumNc for
whichPm remains belowTm. According to Eq.’s (2.5) and (2.6), to decreasePF we need to reduce
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TABLE 2.2. Parameter optimization algorithm for attack strategy:
1- Initialization: putτ = 1,Nc = 1.
DetermineTm andTf as thresholds forPm andPfault
alsoNcmax as the maximum value forNc.
2- τ ← τ + 1 until Pfault > Tf andτ < 64
if Pfault ≤ Tf or τ = 64 go to the next step
3-Nc ← Nc + 1 until Pm > Tm andNc < Ncmax
if Pm ≤ Tm orNc = Ncmax go to the next step
4- Computea0 = ⌈56− log2( θNc )⌉
5- ComputePc for a0 ≤ a ≤ 56
choosea for whichPc has its largest value.
6- Outputτ ,Nc anda as attack parameters.
τ as much as possible. If we define a thresholdTf for Pfault, we can find the smallestτ for which
Pfault remains belowTf . Also, Eve has to choose an optimized value fora to havePc maximized.
The algorithm in Table 2.2, is designed to optimize the linear attack parameters to let Eve achieve
the maximum success ratePc, for a givenη. In this algorithm,Pfault andPm can be computed using
Eq.’s (2.1), (2.3), respectively.
2.4 Main and Wire-tap Channel modeling
In this section, we model main and wiretap channels in block level (with64-bit input and64-bit
output), using a stationary finite state Markov chain (MC). Since Eve might achieve the right frame
key, get a wrong one or even get nothing and drop the whole frame, we also need to model her
channel in frame level as a three state memoryless channel.
2.4.1 Main Channel Modeling Using MC
As it was described, the encrypted data goes through a BSC channel with cross over probability of
η, created by intentionally introduced noise in applicationlayer. We next model the CFB cipher,
channel with deliberate noise and decipher altogether as a single channel, in order to analyze the
effect of intentional noise at the output of decipher. Note that we assume there is no degradation in
actual physical channel.
Fig. 2.3 illustrates the encryption and decryption structure of CFB mode with DES cipher in
the presence of introduced noise to ciphertexts. As shown inthis figure,{Ci} and{Ĉi} are the
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FIGURE 2.3. CFB enciphering and deciphering with channel error
sequences of transmitted 64-bit ciphertext and received noisy ciphertext blocks, respectively, and
{P̂i} is the sequence of decrypted blocks at timei for i = 1, 2, . . .. In addition,{Zi} is the se-
quence of 64-bit blocks of intentional bit errors in channelZji that are independent and identically
distributed with Bernoulli distribution asPr[Zji = 1] = η for j = 1, . . . , 64, such that̂Ci = Ci⊕Zi.
As Fig. 2.3 indicates when̂Ci is noisy, it introduces errors with the rate ofη to the decryption out-
put at time i, i.e.P̂i. Moreover, sincêCi−1 gets encrypted with DES at timei, due to the avalanche
effect, it induces bit error rate ofα in P̂i. As a result, to characterize the channel error state in
decryption output at timei, it is required to consider errors in both currently received ciphertextĈi
and the previous onêCi−1. Hence, we need to define four states.
Note that in a particular case when we considerα = 0.5, whenĈi−1 has error, due to the fact that
half of the ciphertext will be in error, errors in̂Pi will be independent from̂Ci and consequently
from the error state at timei + 1. However, when it has no error, errors in̂Ci will affect both de-
cryption outputs at timesi andi + 1, and therefore the current state will depend on the previous
one. As a result, we have to take all four states into account,each with a different transition prob-
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ability from the input plaintext blockPi denoted as64-bit vectorX to the output stored plaintext
P̂i denoted by64-bit vectorY , and letE = X ⊕ Y denote the transition error vector.
The channel states are defined as: stateS0, in which there is no error from vectorX to the vector
Y and happens when there is no error inĈi andĈi−1. StateS1, which happens when there is at
least one bit error in̂Ci, but no error in DES cipher input,̂Ci−1. StateS2, which shows the situation
in which there is at least one bit error in̂Ci−1 without any error inĈi. In this channel state, due to
the avalanche effect, each bit at the output of DES cipher, flips independently with the probability
of α causing bit error probability ofα in Y . StateS3, in which bothĈi andĈi−1 have at least one
bit error.
For stateS0 we havePr[ej = 1|S0] = 0 and forS2,Pr[ej = 1|S2] = α, whereej denotes thejth
bit of E for j = 1, . . . , 64. On the other hand, we should note that in statesS1 andS3, output bits
can not be treated independently becauseS1 andS3 are based on a given condition on the whole
64-bit ciphertextĈi. Let q denote the probability that there exists at least one bit error inZi as
q = 1− (1− η)64. (2.11)
The next lemma gives the input-output transition probability for statesS1 andS3, which is proven
in Appendix 6.2.
Lemma 3. LetX be the input plaintext andY be the stored plaintext in CFB mode. Assume that the
generated ciphertexts go through a channel with error rate ofη. We denote the HW of the resulted
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FIGURE 2.4. Alice-Bob channel model as a four state MC
whereα is the avalanche bit error rate, andγ is given in Eq. (2.4). The transition probability in
stateS3 for all W (E) is
Pr(Y |X,S3) = (2.13)
γW (E)(1− γ)64−W (E) − αW (E)(1− α)64−W (E)(1− q)
q
.
Next, we need to find state transition probabilities. For insta ce, when the state at timei− 1 was
S2, apparentlyĈi−1 has been error free, so the only condition required to have stat S0 happen at
time i is to receive error freêCi which has the probability of1− q that is the transition probability
from stateS2 to S0. Similarly, we can compute other state transition probabilities. Notably, since
probability of occurrence of the current state only dependson the previous one, Bob’s channel
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whose elements demonstrate the transition probabilities between different states. Note that in each
state, input plaintexts undergo different channel conditions and error probabilities. In fact, the main
channel can only be modeled as a BSC channel in statesS0 andS2 with cross over probabilities of
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FIGURE 2.5. Eve’s hierarchical channel model
0 andα respectively, whereas in other two states it can be modeled based on input-output transition
probabilities in (2.12) and (2.13).
In particular, since in MC model for Alice-Bob channel, all four states can be reached from one
another, it is an irreducible MC with positive recurrent states [79]. Then, with a supposedly large
frame size, MC can reach its stable condition. Since all state re positive recurrent, the set of
equationsPtT = Pt, andPt.1 = 1 have a unique solution asPt = [p0, . . . , p3] wherepk denotes
the steady state probability of stateSk for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} [79]. Where1 is a4 × 1 vector with all




(1− q)2 q(1− q) q(1− q) q2
]
. (2.14)
2.4.2 Wire-tap Channel Modeling
When Eve obtains the right key of a frame with the probability of Pc by using optimized verification
strategy in linear attack, her decrypted data in that frame undergoes the same channel condition
as Bob’s. As shown in Fig. 2.5, we refer to this channel state for Eve as the correct key state in
frame level which occurs with the probability ofPc and can be modeled as a MC with four channel
states in block level. Nevertheless, with the probability of Pe, Eve will not be able to get any key
for the attacked frame and has to drop the whole frame. We refer to this state as erasure state.
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Moreover, Eve gets a wrong key with the probability ofPw, such that after using a wrong key due
to the avalanche effect in DES cipher, each bit in DES output will be independently flipped with
the probability ofα. This induced error Xors with intentional i.i.d. channel noise that has bit error
probability ofη. Consequently, in wrong key state, Eve’s channel can be modeled as a BSC with
cross over probability ofγ given in (2.4). Conclusively, wiretap channel is a degraded vrsion of
the main channel that only in the correct key state can it be asgood as Bob’s channel. In fact,
Eve’s channel behaves like a pseudo two-dimensional MarkovChain (P2DMC) [80] with three
memoryless states in frame dimension, each acting like another MC in block dimension as shown
in Fig. 2.5.
2.5 Secrecy capacity computation
The next step is to quantify the secrecy capacity of the analyzed security system. The capacity of
finite state Markov chains was calculated in [81] and [82]. In[83] and [84] the capacity of the
finite state Markov chains with binary symmetric channels associated in each state, was studied. In
[85] secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel modeled as a finitestat MC is computed. To compute
capacities, we assume that the channel states are perfectlyknown to Bob and Eve in block level,
so what we compute is mutual information between the inputX and outputY given the current
channel state, i.e.I(X;Y |Sl). In frame level, it is assumed that Eve knows the correctnessstate
of each used frame key towards the end of each frame. Specially, this can be considered as the
best scenario for Eve, providing us a lower bound for secrecyate. The main purpose of secrecy
capacity computation is to design a secrecy encoder which isapplied ahead of the encryption in
application layer over multiple frames. Namely, when the message is transmitted at a rate below the
secrecy rate to Bob using a Wyner-type encoding technique [25], [28], we can have an arbitrarily
small error probability for Bob as well as the maximum entropyfor Eve. In the asymptotic sense,
by secrecy encoding, users utilize Eve’s failures which cause her channel to be a degraded channel
compared to Bob’s.
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2.5.1 Capacity of the Main Channel
When channel state information is available, the capacity isthe average of capacities that each one






whereC(Sk) is the channel capacity in stateSk in bit per channel use. It can be computed as the
maximum information rate between input and output vectors,X andY , respectively, assuming that




Note that our modeled four state Markov channel is uniformlysymmetric because in any state,
channel is output symmetric [81]. For instance, in statesS0 andS2, the channel behaves as a BSC
channel. In statesS1 andS3, if we define the transition probability matrix asPij = Pr(Y =
j|X = i, Sl) for i ∈ Y , i ∈ X , l = 1, 3, its rows and columns are permutations of each other
because according to equations (2.12) and (2.13), its elements only depend on the HW difference
of input-output vectors. As a result, also in statesS1 andS3, the channel is output symmetric. In
[81] it is shown that for uniformly symmetric channel in whicnoise is independent of inputs, like
our modeled Markov channel, capacity can be achieved with distribution which is uniform and
iid. Accordingly, in this finite state Markov channel by uniformly distributed inputs, the mutual
information will be essentially maximized.
In stateS0, channel is error-free with capacity of1, i.e.C(S1) = 1, and in stateS2, it acts like
a BSC with cross over probability ofα and the capacity ofC(S2) = 1 − h(α), whereh is binary
entropy function. However, forS1 andS3 in which decryption bit errors are not independent, we
need to compute the mutual information between input and output vectors, namelyI(X;Y |Sl) for
l = 1, 3, that is
I(X;Y |Sl) = H(Y |Sl)−H(Y |X,Sl). (2.17)
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We assume that channel state is perfectly known to Bob. In the following theorem which is proven
(in Appendix 6.3) using Lemma 3, we computeH(Y |X,Sl) for l = 1, 3.
Lemma 4. Consider our four state MC model for the main channel with inputvectorX and output






































On the other hand, for both statesS1 andS3, every output vectorYj can be generated by in-
troducing all possible error vectors over their corresponding input vectors. Hence, since all64-bit
input plaintexts are uniformly distributed, the output will also be equally likely, so forl = 1, 3 the
output entropy isH(Y |Sl) = 64. Thus, by using Eq. (2.17) we can compute the mutual information
for statesS1 andS3 as
I(X;Y |Sl) = 64−H(Y |X,Sl), for l = 1, 3, (2.20)
whereH(Y |S1, X) is given in Eq. (2.18), andH(Y |S3, X) in Eq. (2.19). According to Eq. (2.16)




(bits per channel use), (2.21)
with I(X;Y |S1) andI(X;Y |S3) given in Eq. (2.20). We can analyze Alice-Bob channel as a finite
state MC with steady state probabilities given in Eq. (2.14). Hence, according to Eq. (2.15) Bob’s
channel capacityCB as the average of the state capacities can be computed as
CB = (1− q)2 + q(1− q)[C(S1) + 1− h(α)] + q2C(S3). (2.22)
46
whereα is the average bit error rate caused by the avalanche effect.In addition,C(S1) andC(S3)
are given in Eq. (2.21), implying that these capacities mainly depend onq, γ, α and η . As a
result, the main channel capacity depends onq a dγ which according to Eq.’s (2.11) and (2.4) are
themselves functions ofη, for a fixedα. Therefore, Bob’s channel capacity mainly depends on the
original channel cross over probabilityη.
2.5.2 Secrecy Capacity of the Wire-tap Channel with Noise
When Eve with the probability ofPc obtains the right key, her channel capacity will be the same as
Bob’s, i.e.CB, but when with the probability ofPw gets a wrong key, her channel will turn into a
BSC with the cross over probability ofγ, which has the capacity of1−h(γ). Note that, the erasure
state does not contribute to the capacity. Hence, Eve’s capacity will be
CE = Pw(1− h(γ)) + PcCB, (2.23)
whereCB is given in Eq. (2.22). As discussed in Section 1.3, when the main channel is less noisy
than the wiretap channel and the mutual information betweenAlice at Bob are individually max-
imized by the the same input distribution, the secrecy capacity can be computed as the difference
of two capacities. In our channel model, the first condition hlds and only uniformly distributed
input maximizes both mutual informations, therefore the secrecy capacity will beCs = CB − CE
as:
Cs = CB(1− Pc)− (1− Pe − Pc)(1− h(γ)). (2.24)
This result implies that secrecy capacity mainly depends onPc, Pe andCB. Due to the fact
that allPc, Pe andCB highly depend on the channel error rateη, the main parameter that impacts
secrecy capacity of the system is intentional noise. Namely, if Alice can control the cross over
probability of the channel, it is possible to adjust secrecyrate of the system. Note that Alice applies
secrecy encoding over multiple frames in order to statistically average over Eve’s possible failures
in frame level, and also to enable Bob to do the error correction c ding when burst of errors
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occurs. Basically, Alice and Bob has to use a well designed wiretap channel encoder, based on
the computed secrecy rate in Eq. (2.24). Notably, the main issue in this scheme is delay that is
imposed on the system by applying multiple frame encoding that makes this scheme applicable
only for delay tolerant communication.
2.6 Numerical Results
The main objective of numerical analysis is to evaluate the effect of varyingη on secrecy rate in
order to see if there exists an optimum value forη for which secrecy capacity reaches its maximum.
In simulations, we assume that Alice by controllingη is able to generate a degraded wiretap chan-
nel. In addition, we assume that the whole data is divided into equal size frames, each containing
as many number of64-bit data blocks as four-state MC reaches its steady state, such that for each
frame, encryption and decryption key remains constant.
Let us assume thatθ = 248 is the maximum number of DES encryptions that Eve can perform
to establish an attack on each frame. Because for instance, with a CPU having speed of2.6 GHz,
it takes for about30 hours for her to accomplish these many encryptions. For attack optimization
algorithm proposed in section 2.3.4, the initial values select d forn isn0 = 20, maximum possible
value forNc is chosenNcmax = 100, and the thresholdsTf andTm are set to10−5. Furthermore,
we choseα as avalanche effect bit error rate to be0.5. To evaluate the effect of noise variation
on the performance of the system, we changedη from 10−4 to 0.05 with 500 steps of size10−4.
Moreover, suppose that Eve is able to detect these step size changes onη by probing the channel
and each time is able to optimize all attack parameters usingthe parameter optimization algorithm.
We assume that Eve is not allowed to use more thanNmax = 246 number of pairs in her attack.
In Fig. 2.6, overall success probability, wrong key and frame erasure probabilities are depicted
as functions ofη for fixed number of pairs equal to246. As this Figure displays with risingη,
Pc is monotonically decreasing, reaching zero forη > 0.017, while wrong key probabilityPw
goes to1 for η = 0.05 because of increase inPF . As discussed in section 2.3.1, the obtained
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FIGURE 2.6. Overall success probability, frame erasure and wrong key probabilities versus channel cross
over probability
results forPw show that it becomes considerable for some channel conditios and can not be
ignored. Moreover, the staircases in these curves occur inη’s for which algorithm optimizes and
changes attack parameters. In Fig. 2.7 curves of main and wiretap channel capacities as well as the
secrecy capacity are drawn as functions ofη. This Figure shows that Alice-Bob channel capacity
is monotonically decreasing with increase inη while secrecy capacityCs rises up to its maximum
value0.3442 for η = 0.0125 and then falls. Indeed, this cross over probability can be considered
optimum value for which secrecy capacity achieves its maximum.
TABLE 2.3. Optimized attack parameters using proposed algorithm in subsection 2.3.4
η 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.0125
Nc 5 9 16 20
τ 3 5 6 7
a 23 24 24 27
Pc 0.9999 0.9636 0.5014 0.1618
In Table 2.3 optimized attack parameters using our proposedalgorithm for four differentη’s, i.e.
0.001, 0.005, 0.01 and0.0125 are given. According to this table, with increase inη, the required
number of trialsNc for each key increases from5 to 20 in order to keepPm below the threshold
Tm = 10
−5 when it rises. The same holds for parametersa andτ which to achieve the determined
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FIGURE 2.7. Main channel and Eve’s channel capacities and secrecyapacity for varying channel cross
over probability
thresholds, have to increase with rising channel noise to maxi ize the overall success probability.
According to our numerical results, Alice can adjust channel conditions by introducing deliberate
noise in application layer to haveη = 0.0125, to achieve the desirable secrecy capacity.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we showed that by introducing tunable noise in application layer upon the encrypted
data, even though Eve utilizes an optimized attack strategy, the secrecy rate of the system can
remarkably increase. In fact, Alice can achieve a sufficiently large secrecy capacity by adjusting
the cross over probability of the channel using deliberate noise. This secrecy rate guarantees a
highly secure and reliable communication using wiretap channel coding in application layer over
multiple frames. For secrecy capacity computation we tailored the known channel states scenario.




ARQ Based Symmetric-Key Generation over 
Correlated Erasure Channels
In this chapter based on our work in [16], we focus on the problem of sharing secret keys using
Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) protocol. We consider cases where forward and feedback chan-
nels are erasure channels for a legitimate receiver (Bob) and an eavesdropper (Eve). In prior works,
wiretap channel is modeled as statistically independent packet erasure channels for Bob and Eve.
In this chapter, we go beyond the state-of-the-art by addressing correlated erasure events across
the wiretap channel. The created randomness is shared between two legitimate parties through
ARQ transmissions that will be mapped into a destination set using the first order digital filter with
feedback. Then, we characterize Eve’s information loss about this shared destination set, due to
inevitable transmission errors. This set will be transformed into a highly secure key using privacy
amplification in order to intensify and exploit Eve’s lack of knowledge. We adopt two criteria for
analysis and design of the system: outage probability as a measure of secrecy, and secret key rate
as a metric for efficiency. The resulting secrecy improvement is presented as a function of the
correlation coefficients and the erasure probabilities for both channels. It is shown that secrecy
improvement is achievable even when Eve has a better channel than legitimate receivers, and her
channel conditions are unknown to legitimate users.
3.1 Introduction
The broadcast nature of wireless transmissions makes it more vulnerable from security perspec-
tive. Traditionally, security can be provided using cryptographic approaches, mainly relying on
generation, sharing and renewing of secret keys [33]. However, key management is deemed quite
challenging in wireless networks. Maurer et.al. in [56] considered information theoretic key agree-
ment in noisy communication channel based on common randomness and public discussion. They
have defined secret key rate as the maximal achievable rate at which secret key can be generated by
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legitimate partners (Alice as transmitter and Bob as receiver) about which an eavesdropper (Eve)
has virtually no knowledge.
Among physical layer based key management techniques, somehave utilized the well known
ARQ protocol to facilitate exchange of secret keys between Alice and Bob [53], [54]. In [12]
authors have proposed using ARQ mechanism to generate secrets by taking advantage of Eve’s
inevitable information loss due to transmission errors. Inthis approach, dynamic secrets are ex-
tracted from created common randomness using universal class of hash functions [55]. However,
in all of these works feedback channel is assumed to be error-free which is not satisfied in mo-
bile radio environment. In this work, we consider a key management scheme similar to [12], and
characterize a two-way communication channel model where feedback channel is assumed to be a
Binary Erasure Channel (BEC). Previously, in ARQ communications, feedback transmission was
also modeled as erasure channels [86],[87].
In all of these schemes, it is assumed that erasure events forBob and Eve are statistically inde-
pendent. However, in real radio communications, there could be correlation between channels from
a transmitter to different receivers depending on the availbility of line-of-sight, physical deploy-
ment of the receiver antennas and the presence or absence of satterers [88]. In [89] information
loss in terms of reduction in secrecy capacity due to the correlation in wiretap channel is quantified.
In [90] the effects of correlation between packet erasures at Bob and Eve on the performance of
LDPC based secrecy coding scheme was addressed.
Our work lies in a different category than the works in [1], [9], [89] that rely on secrecy capacity
measure nor do we design specific codes for correlated wiretap ch nnel as [90]. This work is
based on Maurer’s work [56] where key distilling problem from common randomness is studied.
In cryptography community this problem is addressed based on extracting strong security form a
weakly secure source that is common between two parties [5].The main goal in this area is to
increase generation rate of a sufficiently secure key.
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In this work a key scheduling algorithm based on ARQ transmission mechanism used in [12] is
revisited, analyzed more thoroughly, and further modified to address more challenging technical
issues such as synchronization and correlation. The key contributions can be summarized below:
• One of the main issues in ARQ mechanism used to generate sharedrandomness is synchro-
nization. We show that even with erasure feedback channel, synchronization between Alice
and Bob in selection of a random body of transmitted data, called One-Time-Frame (OTF)
set, can be guaranteed using the proposed reconciliation protocol.
• For performance analysis we design an optimized attack strategy based on binary hypothesis
testing [91] allowing Eve to estimate this common randomness.
• We design a digital filter based mapping and apply it over OTF set to generate a destination
set constituting shared random data between legitimate users. By using this mapping strategy
Alice and Bob can take advantage of possible mistakes in Eve’sdeci ions due to transmission
errors in order to cause further information loss for her. This lack of knowledge, will next be
manipulated by applying privacy amplification to establishsecure keys.
• In our correlated wiretap channel model we consider correlation between erasures in main
and eavesdropper’s channel and then analytically and quantitatively study its negative influ-
ence on both secrecy and efficiency of the designed scheme. Westudy the trade-off between
secrecy measured in terms of secrecy outage rate and efficiency in terms of secret key rate
and design system parameters to achieve the required secrecy and efficiency.
In simulations, evaluation of the achieved secrecy shows that almost for all channel conditions
the required security enhancement can be attained, even wheerasures are correlated and Eve
has a better channel than that between legitimate users. Simulat ons also demonstrate that even in
unknown wiretap channel condition a good secrecy is achievabl .
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FIGURE 3.1. Erasure forward and backward channel model for wiretap channel
This chapter is organized as follows. Correlated wiretap channel model is illustrated in section
3.2, and reconciliation strategy is explained in section 3.3. The proposed attack strategy for Eve and
its analysis is presented in section 3.4 followed by description of the mapping strategy in section
3.5. In Section 3.6 we analyze the performance of the designed system in terms of secrecy and
efficiency. Numerical and simulation results are illustrated in section 3.7. We conclude this chapter
in 3.8. Proofs are provided in Appendix.
3.2 Correlated Channel Model
We consider the wiretap channel with memoryless packet erasure channel (PEC) model, where
erasures for Bob and Eve are correlated. In our model, ARQ is added for authenticated users as
shown in Fig. 3.1. We use frame structure whereM number of packets, encrypted using the same
symmetric key and then encoded according to a specific encodig rule, will be encapsulated into a
frame. Alice transmits these packets over the main channelQm to an intended recipient called Bob.
AcrossQm packet erasures occur with probabilityδ. Bob is permitted to request retransmission of
any missing packets up toK times using a feedback channelRm. When he decodes a packet
correctly sends back a bit1 as an ACK, otherwise returns a bit0 as a NACK. Alice receives these
feedback bits throughRm modeled as a BEC with bit erasure probabilityη.
Eve as a passive eavesdropper observes transmitted or retransmitted packets through a wiretap
channelQw modeled as a PEC with packet erasure probabilityε. She is supposedly aware of the
decoding rule and is also able to observe feedback messages through a backward wiretap channel
Rw where bit erasures occur with probabilityθ. SinceQm andQw are memoryless, erasures occur
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independently within each channel. However, packet erasures between two channels are correlated
with correlation coefficientρ. We define two Bernoulli random variablesEm andEw with values
in the set{0, 1}, where one indicates erasure and zero indicates correct reception of a packet at
one-time transmission. Hence,Pr(Em = 1) = δ andPr(Ew = 1) = ε. Let pij = Pr(Em =
i, Ew = j). Then,δ = p10 + p11 = E[Em] = E[E2m] andε = p01 + p11 = E[Ew] = E[E
2
w]. Pearson










We should note that given a value forδ andε, ρ can not take every value in the interval[0, 1] and
will be bounded by the functions of erasure probabilities. Byconsidering thatδ = p11 + p10 and
ε = p11 + p01, and the fact that
∑1
i,j=0 pij = 1 wherepij > 0, we can get the following bounds for
ρ
max(δ + ε− 1, 0)− δε
√
δε(1− δ)(1− ε)
≤ ρ ≤ min(δ, ε)− δε√
δε(1− δ)(1− ε)
. (3.2)
If we define Bernoulli random variablesem andew for erasure events in feedback channelsRm and
Rw, respectively, we will havePr(em = 1) = η andPr(ew = 1) = θ. Let qij = Pr(em = i, ew =










Similar toρ, there also exist bounds forψ. Finally, we have
p11 = ρ
√
δε(1− δ)(1− ε) + εδ, q11 = ψ
√
ηθ(1− η)(1− θ) + ηθ. (3.4)
3.3 Reconciliation Strategy
In this key management scheme only packets that are decoded crrectly for the first transmission
and their corresponding feedbacks are received error-freeby Alice would be selected to be in OTF
set. Once the number of packets in the collected OTF reaches the thresholdnts, they will stop
putting packets into it. The main purpose of reconciliationstep is to make sure that legitimate
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users have no disagreement upon this randomly selected bodyof transmitted data. The next step
is to apply a mapping strategy to generate a destination set that will be next used to extract secret
keys by applying a mutually agreed universal hashing functio over it. Each packet format contains
three important fields: a retransmission flag that is set to1 by Alice when a packet is retransmitted
to let Bob know that it does not belong to OTF, a unique sequencenumber assigned to each packet,
which is the sequence number of the previous packet in the frame incremented by one, and a
dropping flag used for synchronization purposes.
In this scheme, we use Stop and Wait protocol (SW), that requirs Alice to wait for the response
from Bob, which is the feedback message represented by a bit belonging to the set{0, 1, e}. When-
ever Alice receives ACK, represented by bit1, she finds out that a new packet has to be transmitted,
but once she receives a NACK feedback, represented by bit0, she realizes that the packet has to be
retransmitted, thereby suggesting that it is not in OTF. Theerased bite represents the case when
Alice has not received the feedback message at the required tim interval. In this protocol, if the
current packet is received correctly at first transmission,and the next received packet is a new one
with a different sequence number, the receiver can identifythat the current packet belongs to OTF.
Each packet can be retransmitted at mostK imes to make it more likely for Bob to correctly
decode it. If no ACK is received withinK retransmissions, Alice drops the packet.
One of the main problems in this algorithm is OTF synchronization issue because there is possi-
bility of discrepancy between Alice and Bob. For instance, assume that Bob has received a packet
correctly in the first transmission, yet ACK has not gone through the backward channel in any of
its retransmissions. Since Alice has not received any ACK, she will decide to drop the packet and
transmit a new one. Next, Bob receives a packet with a different s quence number, leading him to
put the previous packet into OTF. We include a dropping flag ineach packet to avoid such problems
which is set to one for a packet when the number of consecutively dropped packets prior to it is
odd, and zero otherwise.
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TABLE 3.1. Denotations
i Theith correctly received packet by Bob
ki The Reception time for packeti
Pi The assigned sequence number to packeti
Fi The corresponding feedback of packeti
SRi The retransmission flag sign associated with packeti
SDi The dropping flag sign associated with packeti
Suppose that at the beginning of each frame, the timers in both sides launch and increments
by one by each packet transmission. Consider the denotationsin Tab. 3.1. Let the next correctly
received packeti + 1 arriving at timeki+1 have the sequence number ofPi+1 = Pi + j and the
dropping flag sign ofSDi+1. Therefore, Bob realizes that there werej − 1 dropped packets within
the time interval[ki, ki+1]. Wheneverj− 1 is odd andSDi+1 = 0, or j− 1 is even andSDi+1 = 1,
he finds out that packeti is dropped and does not belong OTF. The pseudo-codes for Alice and
Bob’s OTF packets selection strategies are presented in Tab.’s 3.2, 3.3. Alice puts a packeti into
OTF if at first transmission, the received feedbackFi = 1. On the other side, fromSRi, Bob can
realize that it is not a retransmission, and also by observing Pi, Pi+1 andSDi+1 she finds out it is
not dropped and belongs to OTF.
TABLE 3.2. Alice’s OTF strategy
If packeti is transmitted more than once, setSRi = 1 andi 6∈OTF
Else setSRi = 0 and wait for feedbackFi
If Fi = 1 put packeti into OTF, Elsei is not in OTF
TABLE 3.3. Bob’s OTF strategy
If packeti is received correctly, checkSRi
If SRi = 1, i is not in OTF, Else checkPi+1
If Pi+1 = Pi + j for j 6= 0, then
If j is odd (even) andSDi+1 = 0(1), put i into OTF
Else,i is not in OTF
When Alice and Bob make decisions based on these strategies, itcan be guaranteed that their
synchronization error on OTF set is zero, and both completely agree onnts OTF packets that later
on will be used as a basis to establish secret keys. As a result, packet that are received correctly
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with probability1− δ and their feedbacks are received correctly with probability 1− ε, will be in
common OTF set with the probability of
Pc = (1− δ)(1− η). (3.5)
3.4 Eve’s attack strategy and its performance
Even though Eve is able to eavesdrop retransmissions as wellas feedback messages, unlike Alice
and Bob, she is not certain of synchronization with users. In fact, that is because her transmission
errors are partially independent from the errors in the mainchannel, and she is unable to directly
communicate with the transmitter, or for instance ask for retransmission as Bob does. As a result,
she has to determine a strategy to make decisions based on theeavesdropped data.
Let iE indicate a packet that Eve has received correctly with sequence numberPiE , associated
feedback messageFiE and retransmission flagSRiE . Let alsoiE + 1 denote Eve’s next correctly
received packet. Note that to decide which packets are in OTF, Eve has to make the best use of her
obtained information about these packets. There are some cases that help Eve confidently know
what exactly users did with the packetiE. For instance, whenSRiE is one, orFiE is zero, she can
ascertain that packetiE does not belong to OTF.
In other cases wherePiE+1 6= PiE , Eve has to make a guess about packetiE based on her main
observation which is the feedback message,FiE . In this scheme Eve uses binary hypothesis testing
based on Maximum A-Posteriori Probability (MAP) rule [91] as her strategy in distinguishing
OTF packets. LetH1 be the hypothesis that packeti is in Alice and Bob’s OTF andH0 otherwise.
Assuming that packetiE is the same packeti which is simultaneously received by Bob, according
to the MAP decision rule, for the received feedbackFiE 6= 0 by Eve, she decides that packetiE
belongs to OTF set if
Pr[H1|FiE , Eiw = 0] > Pr[H0|FiE , Eiw = 0], (3.6)
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Eiw indicates the random variableEw associated with one-time transmission of packetiE, i.e.
Eiw = 0 means packetiE is received correctly by Eve. The following theorem with theprovided
proof in Appendix 6.4 gives us a more explicit idea about Eve’s decision rule.
Theorem 3. Assume that Eve makes a decision based on the MAP rules in Eq. (3.6). Then, for
a correctly received packet when she receives feedback1, she makes a decision in favor ofH1 if
Γ > 0, whereΓ is defined as
Γ , 1− 2η − θ + 2ψ
√
ηθ(1− η)(1− θ) + 2ηθ. (3.7)
On the other hand, when she receives an erased feedback, she makes decision in favor ofH1 if
Λ > 0 which is defined as
Λ , 2
[











Accordingly, the pseudo-code for Eve’s attack strategy in distinguishing OTF packets is pre-
sented in Table 3.4.
TABLE 3.4. Eve’s Attack strategy
If packetiE is received correctly, checkSRiE
If SRiE = 1, theniE is not in OTF, Else, wait for feedbackFiE
If FiE = 0, theniE is not in OTF
Else ifPiE+1 6= PiE , then
If FiE = 1 andΓ > 0, put iE into OTF
Else ifFiE = e andΛ > 0, put iE into OTF
ElseiE is not in OTF
In order to analyze Eve’s performance, we need to investigate how much discrepancy her OTF
has with the actual one, namely with what probability, she misses an OTF packet, called OTF
missing probabilityPm, or chooses a non-OTF packet, called false OTF probabilityPF . Pm is the
probability that given hypothesisH1 has occurred for packetiE, Eve does not choose it as an OTF
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packet.PF is the probability that given hypothesisH0, Eve putsiE into OTF. In Lemma 5, whose
proof is given in Appendix 6.5, we compute these probabilities.
Lemma 5. In our scheme, if Eve uses the proposed attack strategy, she miss s one OTF packet
with the probability of
Pm =1(Γ<0)
(1− η − θ + q11)(1− δ − ε+ p11)
(1− δ)(1− η) (3.9)
+1(Λ<0)
(θ − q11)(1− δ − ε+ p11)
(1− η)(1− δ) +
ε− p11
1− δ .
Moreover, she puts a wrong packet into OTF with probability
PF =1(Λ>0)θ(δ − p11) +
[
1(Λ>0)q11 + 1(Γ>0)(η − q11)
]
(1− δ − ε+ p11). (3.10)
where1A is the indicator function, which is equal to1 whenA holds.p11 andq11 are provided in
Eq. (3.4).
3.5 Eve’s Misalignment and OTF Mapping strategy
Whenever Eve has a miss-detection, by missing a packet or putting a wrong packet into OTF, as-
suming that her next OTF packets are selected correctly, hergathered OTF set respectively moves
one packet size backward or forward compared to the originalset. Hereafter, she loses her OTF
alignment with Alice and Bob, and in order to realign with the users, she has to have the same
number of OTF missing events as the false OTF packets. However, If Alice and Bob take a strategy
by mapping OTF into a destination set where once a misalignment occurs, the resulted error prop-
agates to upcoming packets, any miss-detection for Eve would be equivalent to missing the rest of
the transformed data.
A possible mapping strategy is a simple digital filter with a delayed feed back. LetXi and
Wi denote respectively theith packet in the original OTF and in the destination set, wherei =
1, . . . , nts. After applying this transformation, whose block diagram is depicted in Fig. 3.2,Wi
will be the result of Xor ofXi andWi−1. Note that only the random body of each OTF packet
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FIGURE 3.2. Block diagram of the simple digital filter used for mapping OTF set
will be used in this mapping. LetMmax be the maximum possible number of packets within the
frame. If each packet has sizenb, by excluding the sequence number as well as two bit flags, only
nr = nb − log2Mmax − 2 bits of each packet will be transformed, soXi’s have sizenr, and the
generated destination set will be of sizen = ntsnr.
TABLE 3.5. Alice-Bob and Eve’s OTF and destination sets
OTFAB X2 X3 X4
OTFE X3 X ′3 X4
DSAB X1 ⊕X2 X1 ⊕X2 ⊕X3 X1 ⊕X2 ⊕X3 ⊕X4
DSE X1 ⊕X3 X1 ⊕X3 ⊕X ′3 X1 ⊕X3 ⊕X ′3 ⊕X4
Consider a simple case when the number of packets within OTF set is nts = 4. In Tab. 3.5 Alice
and Bob’s OTF as OTFAB and Eve’s OTF as OTFE (starting from the second packet) are illustrated
when Eve missesX2 and has a false event by choosingX ′3. In this case even though OTFE has
missed its alignment at the second packet, it realigns with OTFAB at X4 resulting in only two
packet discrepancies between them. The resulted destination set for legitimate users asDSAB and
for Eve asDSE are given in Tab. 3.5. We assume thatXi’s are generated uniform randomly, so
for instance for the third and the fourth packets inDSE, X2 ⊕ X3 behaves like an additive noise
with error rate of0.5. That is why when a misalignment occurs, for the remaining packets inDSE,
missed or false OTF packets act like additive noise to further deceive Eve. In other words, every
miss-detection causes an uncertainty for her that accumulates in upcoming packets, resulting in
a larger uncertainty for Eve in her destination set. In general, when there is a miss-detection at
jth packet, by utilizing the suggested mapping strategy, any realignment for Eve becomes highly
unlikely, and it can be guaranteed that there will be errors in the rest ofnts − j packets of Eve’s
destination set.
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3.6 Secrecy Scheme Design and Analysis
Throughout transmission of each frame by using the ARQ protocol and mapping strategy, Alice
and Bob will generate a destination set upon which they both completely agree. When a function is
chosen uniform-randomly from a universal class of hash functio s, regardless of what distribution
the actual input has, for sufficiently short output, the expected hash output will have a distribution
close to uniform with maximum entropy. By the last packet of the frame, Alice will transmit this
chosen function to Bob that will be applied over the produced dstination set to extract secret keys,
later on being used as a symmetric key for encryption of the next frame. As a result, for a short hash
output they can make sure that Eve, given her knowledge, getsarbitrarily negligible information
about it.
In order to analyze the designed secrecy scheme, we define appropriate metrics whereby the
required secrecy and efficiency for the system can be regulated. We define outage probability as
the probability that the aimed information theoretic secrecy is not achieved, based on which system
parameters will be designed. Furthermore, we use secret keyrat to measure secrecy throughput
and efficiency of the scheme.
3.6.1 Outage Probability based on a New Oracle Model
In [55], the additional information that a virtual oracle frely gives Eve is considered as an auxiliary
random variable that simplifies secrecy analysis for privacy mplification. Assume that a virtual
oracle freely informs Eve that in which packet she first missed h r alignment with Alice-Bob OTF.
Let this packet be theNc + 1st OTF packet, so that Eve knows with a high probability she has
observedNc packets, with lengtht = Ncnr denoted byV , correctly from the actual destination
setW . Nonetheless, she will have error propagation in the remaining packets because of using the
proposed mapping strategy. Eve can not correct her mistake by using this additional information
because she has no idea what kind of miss-detection has occurred or what happened after this
misalignment. Literally, the secrecy that system obtains in the presence of this oracle provides a
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lower-bound of the actual secrecy that scheme could have gained without giving such a privilege
to Eve.
Let V = e(W ) and functione : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}t be an arbitrary eavesdropping function,
with t < n, wheren = ntsnr is the length of the input stringW . Alice and Bob arbitrarily choose
a functionG from a universal class of hash functions, mapping{0, 1}n into {0, 1}r, and then
apply it overW to get a secret keyQ of sizer, wherer = n − t − s. According to Lemma 1
(corollary 4 in [55]), Eve’s expected information about thesecret key, givenG andV , satisfies
I(Q;G, V ) ≤ 2−s/ ln 2. As information theoretic secrecy goal, if we require the upper-bound of
I(Q;GV ) to beIsup, the necessarys is
s = − log[ln(2)Isup], (3.11)
for logarithm of base 2. Butn−t = r+s is the length of the input string after misalignment. Hence,
for the requireds and givenr, the minimum required number of packet discrepancies between two












Consequently, if we design the system in a way that with a high probability misalignment in OTF
set happens at one of the firstnts − l + 1 OTF packets, we can make sure that after mapping, it is
very likely to have the number of different packets betweenV andW , denoted byNe, be more than
l. We define outage probability as the probability thatNe < l, which actually is the probability that
determined secrecy goal asI ≤ Isup is not satisfied. The following Theorem, proven in Appendix
6.6, provides an upper-bound for outage probability.
Theorem 4. Let secrecy outagePout be the probability that there exists less thanl packet discrep-









wherents is the number of packets in OTF.Pm, PF andPc can be computed using Eq.’s (3.9),
(3.10) and (3.5).
Note that in our analysis we will consider the worst case scenario where equality in Eq. (3.13)
holds. Now we can determine the minimum average uncertaintythat Eve has about the generated
secret key. LetW be a random n-bit string with uniform distribution over{0, 1}n, andV be the
random variable indicating what Eve observes correctly form W with the help of the oracle. Let
us definePout as the probability that the length ofV is larger thant bits for somet < n, and let
s < n−t be a positive safety parameter, such thatr = n−t−s. With the probability1−Pout, V will
take on values ofv that belong to the setAv constituted of subsets ofW with less than or equal to
t bits. In this case, as the most optimistic scenario for Eve, sh will know t bits correctly out ofW .
If Alice and Bob chooseG as their universal hashing function from{0, 1}n to {0, 1}r, according
to corollary 5 in [55] her information about the secret keyQ = G(W ) with lengthr will be upper-
bounded asI(Q;G, V = v) < 2−s/ ln 2 or in other wordsH(Q|G, V = v) ≤ r − 2−s/ ln 2. Since
this holds for everyv ∈ Av, by statistical averaging overAv, Eve’s average entropy aboutQ given




Pv(V = v)H(Q|G, V = v) = Pr(Av)[r − 2−s/ ln 2]
= (1− Pout)[r − 2−s/ ln 2] ≥ (1− Pout)r − 2−s/ ln 2 (3.14)
ForW with the length ofntsnr, andt = (nts− l)nr bits, we can replacePout with its upper-bound
in Eq. (3.13) to consider the most pessimistic scenario.
3.6.2 Secret Key Rate
The next step is to quantify and analyze efficiency of the designed secrecy system in terms of secret
key rate. First of all, we need to design system parameters including the size of OTF set and data
frame, to guarantee that the system is sufficiently secure. As will be described later, these are two
parameters that mainly affect efficiency of the system. In order to maintain a large uncertainty for
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Eve, according to Eq. (3.14), we need to haves large enough andPout as small as possible. Ifs
is chosen based on the determinedIsup in Eq. (3.11), with outage probability sufficiently close to
0, we can have a highly likely secure system, with Eve’s averag entropy close to maximum. The
number of packets in OTF,nts, can be lower-bounded accordingly to have outage probability stay
below a thresholdTout chosen to be sufficiently small, i.e.Pout < Tout
nts =
⌈
(l − 1) + − log Tout
logPd − log[(1− Pm)Pc]
⌉
, where Pd = 1− (1− Pc)(1− PF ). (3.15)
nts only takes integer values, andl is obtained by Eq. (3.12). Note that− log(Tout) is positive.
We also need to have enough number of packets within each frame to ake sure that the number
of OTF packets reaches to the thresholdnts. The probability that a packet is in OTF isPc. The total
number of packets being in OTF out ofM packets has binomial distribution with parameterPc. We
call the probability of having at leastnts OTF packets withinM packets, success probability and
denote it byPs. In order to have enough number of packets within OTF set witha high probability,









P kc (1− Pc)M−k ≥ Ts. (3.16)
Clearly, with increase in ts the required number of packets in a frame, i.e.M , goes up.
There is an outage probability1 − Ps that the number of OTF packets does not reach to the
required thresholdnts. When such an outage occurs, Alice and Bob can use the existing OTF
packets to complete OTF set. Suppose that Alice has already finished transmission of the whole
frame but the created OTF set still lacksh number of packets. In this case, since they both agree
on thents − h accumulated OTF packets, one possible alternative would beOTF refilling protocol





packets and then selects
one packet out of each subset in order to refill the remainingh vacant positions. Note that rarely
does this outage event occur for a well designed system, and he ce its overall effect on Eve’s
knowledge will be negligible.
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Secret key rate is the maximal rateR > 0 such that for everyα > 0, there exists a public
communication over an insecure but authenticated channel,ov r which Alice and Bob who agree
upon a random data can generate keysQ andQ′ respectively, whereQ = Q′ with probability
at least1 − α. Also, I(Q;V ) ≤ α, andH(Q)/N ≥ R − α, whereV is data observed by Eve,
andN is the number of channel uses [56]. In our secrecy scheme, Alice and Bob both agree on
a random data called destination set by using reconciliation pr tocol and mapping strategy, then
they transform it into the secret keyQ of lengthr which is the same for both of them. Moreover,
according to Eq. (3.14) sinceH(Q) = r, we can compute Eve’s information about the keyQ given
her knowledgeG, V asI(Q;G, V ) = H(Q) − H(Q|G, V ) ≤ 2−s/ ln 2 + Poutr. Namely, design
of a system with a very low outage probability and sufficiently larges results in a negligible key
information for Eve. As a result, we achieved the required public transmission and can compute
secret key rate as the length of the generated hash value overthe total transmission cost which is
the number of channel uses including retransmissions.
Assume that for the designed key generating ARQ protocol, dueto throughput requirements the
maximum number of allowed retransmissions per packet is setto beK. In our scheme, given that
a packet is received correctly, the probability that it is transmitted forR times with1 ≤ R ≤ K+1
is Pc(1 − Pc)R−1. On the other hand, not being received correctly by Bob implies that the packet
was transmitted forK +1 times. It is straightforward to show that the average numberof trials per





WhenM is fixed and also sufficiently large, by the Strong Law of Largenumbers (SLL), the total
number of transmissions denoted byR for M packets in the frame will beMµr. For nb as the
number of bits per packet, the number of channel uses isRnb bits. Since secret key rate is the ratio
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It should be noted that when to meet the secrecy requirements, M i chosen to be the minimum
possible value for which Eq. (3.16) is satisfied,Rs gives us the maximum achievable key rate.
To study the trade-off between secrecy and efficiency of the system, we evaluate system per-
formance in various settings of design parameters. If it is required to have a higher information
theoretic secrecy meaning that a lower upper-bound for Eve’s information about the key, i.e.Isup,
is mandated, Eq.’s (3.11) and (3.12) show that highers andl are needed. However, a system that is
designed to guarantee a higher discrepancy between Bob and Eve turns out to have a lower secret
key rate and a larger secrecy outage rate. That is because with decrease in the exponent of Eq.
(3.13) due to the increase inl since its base is less than 1,Pout ascends, whereas according to Eq.
(3.15) with increase inl, nts and consecutivelyM go up that brings about a lowerRs based on Eq.
(3.18). Accordingly, the thresholdIsup should be precisely determined, otherwise unnecessarily
low Isup can negatively affect both secrecy and efficiency.
If for a fixed channel condition, and specifiedIsup andr resulting in a fixedl, the system designer
tailors to a higher secrecy or a lower secrecy outage rate by rgulating a lower outage threshold
Tout, according to Eq. (3.15), it elevatesnts that causesM to rise andRs to descend. Conversely,
raisingRs by reducingM according to Eq. (3.16) lowersnts and causesPout to ascend, as Eq.
(3.13) indicates. Namely,Pout increases with risingRs, or having a higher efficiency requires a
lower secrecy and vice versa. This trade-off between secrecy and efficiency should be taken into
account in system architecture.
3.6.3 The Effect of Correlation on System Performance
To study the effect of correlation on the system secrecy, we need to investigate how it affects two
defined secrecy metrics. Suppose that with some fixed forwardand backward erasure rates, for a
predetermined secrecy requirement, system parameters includi g nts, M and l are designed. We
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want to analyze how increase in correlation between erasures in main and eavesdropper channels
influences outage probability. We only consider the caseΓ > 0 which is more conforming to the
real world conditions in which transmission error rates aremuch smaller than0.5. For Λ > 0,
based on Eq.’s (3.9) and (3.10) we can obtain missing and false OTF probabilities as
Pm =
ε− p11




1− δ , (3.19)
PF = θδ + η(1− δ − ε) + p11(η − θ).
According to Eq. (3.4) with increase inρ, p11 increases. Assuming that feedback erasure ratesη
andθ are close to each other, the effect ofp11 and consequentlyρ on PF will be insignificant.
However, Eq. (3.19) shows that with risingρ and thereforep11, Pm falls that accordingly increases
Pout based on Eq. (3.13). Thus, for an already designed system, increase in correlation leads to
a larger outage rate. On the other hand, if we design new system parameters, with increase inρ,
as a result of reduction inPm, according to Eq. (3.15), system will require a largernts as well
as a largerM to produce a lower secrecy key rateRs. It is also intuitively correct that the more
correlated Eve’s forward channel erasures are with Bob’s, the more conforming her decisions about
the received packets to Bob’s, reducing her uncertainty, so that more data will be transmitted to
carry the same amount of uncertainty for her, thereby reducing secret key rate. In this caseψ does
not have any effect onRs because forΛ,Γ > 0, according to Tab. 3.4, Eve’s decision does not
depend on whether the received feedback bit is erased, making her performance independent of
the correlation across backward channels. It could also be inferred from independence ofPm and
PF from ψ in Eq. (3.19).
ForΛ < 0 by Eq.’s (3.9), (3.10), missing and false OTF probabilitiescan be rewritten as
Pm =
(θ − q11)(1− δ) + ε(1− η)
(1− η)(1− δ) − p11
1 + q11 − θ − η
(1− δ)(1− η) ,
PF = (η − q11)(1− δ − ε) + p11(η − q11). (3.20)
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In this scenario for already designed system, with increased ρ and thenp11, Pm decreases whereas
PF increases. However, from Eq.’s (3.20), whenη andθ are much smaller than1, the effect ofp11
on increasingPF can be assumed to be negligible. This prevailing effect on reducingPm causes
Pout to go up, by Eq. (3.13), and for a new design, according to Eq. (3.15), requires system to have
a largernts andM reducing secret key rate. UnlikeΛ > 0, here increase inψ impacts system
performance as for an erased feedback, Eve decides not to putpacket in OTF. For an already
designed system parameters, by Eq (3.4) onceq11 rises with increase inψ, according to Eq. (3.20),
bothPm andPF decrease causingPout to increase. On the other hand, for a new design it reduces
Rs by requiring a largernts. Overall, correlation in both forward and backward channels influences
secrecy and efficiency of the system in a negative way by decreasingRs and increasingPout.
3.7 Simulation Results
Our objective in simulations is to evaluate secrecy and effici ncy of the designed scheme in various
channel conditions. We assume that there exists no discrepancy between Alice and Bob using rec-
onciliation strategy, and that the number of packets in OTF always reaches tonts by OTF refilling
protocol. In these simulations, we requires = 20 implying that the upper-bound on Eve’s infor-
mation about secret key does not exceedIsup = 2−20/ ln 2 which is sufficiently negligible. For the
maximum number of packets within each frame chosen to beMmax = 4096 with each packet of
lengthnb = 78-bits, we excludelog2 4096 = 12 number of bits dedicated for sequence number as
well as two flag bits from the packet to getnr = 64-bit random part used for key establishment. For
the generated key length ofr = 640-bit, according to Eq. (3.12), the minimum required number
of packet discrepancies for Eve will bel = 11. We set the thresholdsTs = 0.99, Tout = 0.01 and
chooseK = 0, so packets can only be transmitted once.
3.7.1 Numerical Analysis Based on Secret Key Rate
In numerical analysis we experiment how secret key rate changes with varying correlation. It is
assumed that wiretap channel quality is better than the maincha nel asδ = η = 0.2 but ε =
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FIGURE 3.3. Obtained secret key rate in terms of forward and backwardcorrelation coefficients with
δ = η = 0.2 andε = θ = 0.1.
θ = 0.1. Then, for different forward and backward correlation coefficients, based on the secrecy
requirementPout < Tout, nts andM are computed using Eq.’s (3.15), (3.16). Namely, for an upper-
boundedPout, eachρ andψ result in a different secret key rateRs based on Eq. (3.18). Forψ < 0.2,
sinceΛ > 0, increase inρ from 0 to0.8 reducesRs from 0.135 to 0.075 as illustrated in Fig. 3.3
which conforms with our analysis. As was expected, in this caseψ does not have any effect on
Rs. However, forψ > 0.2, we getΛ < 0, and therefore with increase inψ, secret key rate goes
down to about0.04 for largeψ andρ, as shown in Fig. 3.3. Note that correlation coefficients are
upper-bounded based on Eq. (3.2). These results show that even when Eve has a better channel
than legitimate users, our scheme can provide secrecy for the established key except for highly
correlated channel errors.
3.7.2 System Robustness Against Various Channel Conditions
In our simulation we study whether for all channel conditions, the designed system maintains its
robustness for required secrecy criterion, i.e.Pout < Tout. To study how forward channel erasure
rates influence system performance, throughout this simulation consistent condition for feedback
channel asη = θ = 0.2, as well as fixed correlation coefficientsρ = ψ = 0.2 are considered. For
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FIGURE 3.4. Simulated outage rate for different forward packet erasure rates in main and wiretap channels,
with ρ = ψ = 0.2 andη = θ = 0.2.
the predeterminedIsup, we getl = 11, meaning that outage occurs when the number of mismatches
between Eve’s destination set and the actual set is less than11. Suppose that Alice is aware of the
main and wiretap channel conditions such that for each differentδ andε, determinesnts andM .
Then, for the designed system, with50000 frames, we apply the OTF packet selection within
each frame based on Alice and Bob’s strategy in Tab.’s 3.2, 3.3by simulating the erasure rates
on their packet and feedback receptions. Similarly, based on Eve’s strategy in Tab. 3.4, we find
Eve’s chosen OTF packets. For each frame, due to mapping strategy, the number of correct packets
in Eve’s destination sets is the number of packets in her OTF before the first mismatch which is
known to Eve by a virtual oracle. Then, by counting the numberof frames with outage event we get
the average outage rate or experimentalPout for each channel condition. In Fig. 3.4, the simulated
outage rate is depicted for varying forward channel conditions. It illustrates that even whenε < δ,
namely when wiretap channel has advantage over the main channel, the experimental outage rate
is below0.003 which is much lower than the required thresholdTout = 0.01, indicating that system
is sufficiently secure and robust.
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FIGURE 3.5. Simulated outage rate in terms of correlation coefficients acrossforward and backward chan-
nels, withδ = ε = 0.2 andη = θ = 0.2.
3.7.3 System Robustness Against Unknown Wiretap Channel
To study the situation in which Alice is unaware of wiretap channel condition, we conducted an-
other simulation with the same secrecy parameters assumingthat Alice designs the system and
determinesnts, M based on a presumed correlation coefficientsρ = ψ = 0.2, such that this de-
sign remains consistent throughout the simulation. All channel erasure rates are supposed to be
fixed and equal to0.2. Then, for differentρ, ψ’s simulation is run with50000 frames to obtain the
average outage rate. In Fig. 3.5 the experimental secrecy outage rate is drawn in terms of various
forward and backward channel correlations. As it shows, forthe most of the region, outage proba-
bility is very low, and the system is stable, but whenρ andψ go above0.4, outage rate rises very
sharply, withPout remaining belowTout = 0.01 except forρ, ψ > 0.7. As a result, even with the
lack of knowledge about wiretap channel correlations, the designed system remains sufficiently
secure except for very highly correlated case.
We repeat this simulation but this time with presumed wiretap channel erasure ratesε = θ = 0.2,
and correlation coefficients that are fixed and equal to0.2. Then, we draw experimentally obtained
Pout in terms of the varyingε andθ in Fig. 3.6. It illustrates that backward erasure rateθ has little
effect on average secrecy outage rate except for very lowε’s. However, as forward erasure rate
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FIGURE 3.6. Simulated outage rate in terms of wiretap channel forward and bckward erasure rates, with
ρ = ψ = 0.2 andδ = η = 0.2.
exceeds the presumedε = 0.2, secrecy outage goes up steeply till it reaches to0.006 for ε = 0
due to the reduction inPm, never exceeding the threshold0.01. These two simulations show that
without prior knowledge about Eve’s channel conditions, system preserves its robustness from
secrecy point of view. Note that simulated outage probability shows much better results than the
numerically computed outage rate in Eq. (3.13) because systm is designed based on the upper-
bound for the actual outage probability (as explained in Appendix 6.6). It provides a pessimistic
design of the protocol giving a safety margin when presumptions about channel conditions no
longer hold.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, a key scheduling scheme based on ARQ mechanism d privacy amplification is
studied. We considered a correlated main and wiretap channel model with noisy feedback channels.
The system is designed and its secrecy is analyzed based on outage probability and secret key rate.
With numerical and theoretical analysis we showed that correlation between Eve’s and legitimate
users transmission errors has negative effect on system secrecy. The conducted simulations proved
that this scheme delivers its security and maintains its stability even when wiretapper has advan-
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Two-Layer Secrecy System with Exponential 
Security Against Unbounded Adversary
This chapter is based on our work in [17]. In this work tailoring to any presumed condition on com-
munication channel or any restriction on adversary’s resources we design a secrecy scheme with
information leakage that decays at an exponential rate. The only requirement for such an exponen-
tially secure system is existence of a common key source between legitimate users that is partially
known by Eve. A key extractor based on a sampler and a Rényi extractor derives secret keys with
the required entropy from this source. A general cipher uses this key to ensure the required equiv-
ocation for the plaintext and to establish the first layer of secrecy. Using privacy amplification on
top of this cipher based on inverse universal2 hashing constitutes the second layer of secrecy for
highly confidential message transmission with information leakage that is exponentially decreas-
ing. We provide secrecy exponent analysis and optimization to minimize information leakage in
terms of two metrics: mutual information and Eve’s distinguishability based onL1 norm distance
from uniformity. The required key rate is characterized for different source entropies in order to
guarantee the secrecy that is demanded in terms of secrecy exponent for the second secrecy layer
and Eve’s error rate for the first layer.
4.1 Introduction
The basic secrecy system includes a sender Alice who attempts to transmit as many messages as
possible to Bob, which are secured against an eavesdropper who attempts to attain the source infor-
mation from Alice based on her prior knowledge and observation. In order to design and optimize
a secrecy system, we need to evaluate its secrecy by quantifying the amount of information leaked
to Eve.
In our secrecy model we consider an unbounded passive adversary and first measure information
leakage in terms of mutual information between Alice and Eve’s variables. Some works in infor-
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mation theory community adopted information leakage basedon mutual information as secrecy
criterion [1, 9, 47]. These works only consider a security metric based on mutual information
which is required to be negligible for uniformly distributed random message sources. However, in
reality, we cannot expect any finitely long messages to be uniformly random since no universally
source independent compression exists for such finite sources [62]. Rather, we use a stronger notion
of security and require that mutual information to be negligib e for any given message distribution.
In cryptography community, security of ciphers has been mainly evaluated on the basis of
computationally based metrics against resource constrained attackers. However, recently some
researchers have used statistical measures, like variational distance, as secrecy criterion against
adversary with unbounded computational power [4–7]. Variation l distance is closely related to
practical notions of secrecy like Eve’s distinguishability and can be used to provide a universally
composable notion of secrecy that allows to express secrecyrequirement for any protocol environ-
ment. As in [7] Eve’s distinguishability is defined as half oftheL1 norm distance that is closely
related to universal composable security. We adopt Eve’s distinguishability based onL1 distance
as another metric to evaluate information leakage from cryptographic point of view.
As studied by [55, 56, 93] in privacy amplification when equivocation of the original information
source is larger than the random number generation rate, it is possible to generate a random variable
about which Eve’s information converges to zero asymptotically. In realistic setting the speed of
convergence is of paramount importance because we can only manipulate finite length of random
variables. In information theory community the rate of exponential decrease, i.e. error exponent,
has been widely discussed [9, 58, 94].
Some works have utilized privacy amplification in the context of physical layer secrecy [58, 63,
95]. Hayashi in [58] showed that when input has equivocationin terms of Rényi entropy of order
1+α, after application of universal2 hash function, Eve’s information about the generated random
variable decreases at an exponential rate that can be lower-bounded. This bound is more general-
ized and in some cases even tighter than the bound obtained byBennett in [55]. In [63] Hayashi
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also provided a lower-bound of theL1 distance between the output of universal hashing and the
uniform random number. However, these works similar to the most of work done in physical layer
secrecy (as described in [96]) make some presumptions and require some knowledge about phys-
ical channel conditions. Conversely, we do not rely on any physical channel, instead we consider
end-to-end secrecy which can be multihop or through interne.
As the only advantage over adversary, we assume that legitimate users have an initial source of
randomness in common that is not uniformly distributed for which Eve has some partial knowl-
edge. Such assumption was also made in previous works [6, 10]. This random data shared between
Alice and Bob does not need to be absolutely secret, and obtaining such a randomness through
public discussion or reconciliation is much easier than providing completely secret bits. In par-
ticular, extracted keys in many applications can be repeatedly derived from this source by each
time independently sampling of it. This initial key source can be generated through outputs of an
imperfect random number generator, a statistical sampler [10] from unpredictable events or a key
exchange protocol such as the technique, we used in Chapter 3.Although we consider error free
physical channel, physical layer and wireless channel characte istics in wiretap channel model can
be used as another means to create such correlated randomness whereby the required keys can be
extracted [51].
Utilizing a general cipher like Shannon-type cipher can guarantee the required secrecy for en-
crypted message in terms of equivocation given Eve’s knowledge. The question we address is
that how on top of this cipher we can leverage the existing uncertainty about this weak source
of randomness to ensure that decreasing exponent of informati n leakage against an unbounded
adversary is sufficiently large making its secrecy asymptotically close to perfect secrecy. For this
purpose, we adopt privacy amplification using an invertibleuniversal2 hash function [4] based on
⊙ multiplication in GF(qn) that can be implemented with less amount of calculation thanmost
physical layer secrecy approaches whose construction resort to some sophisticated error correction
codings [28]. Our contribution can be itemized as:
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1. We design a two-layer secrecy scheme in which the privileged advantage for Alice and Bob,
that is quantified by Eve’s prior uncertainty about the key source, is amplified by an extractor,
an inverse universal hash, and a general cipher. In the first layer, enciphering with a secure
key assures the required equivocation for regular message tr nsmission that are encapsulated
into plaintext blocks. The second layer secrecy that provides exponential secrecy consists of
an inverse universal hash operation that transforms the input source message into multiple
plaintext blocks being encrypted using the extracted key. At the receiver end after decipher-
ing and recovering these blocks, and then applying universal hash over them, information
that leaks to an unbounded adversary and is measured in termsof utual information and
L1 distance approaches zero at an exponential rate.
2. In this two-layer secrecy scheme with a given random number generation rate and source
distribution we provide exponent analysis for both mutual information andL1 distance as
metrics of security. Our secrecy analysis demonstrates quantitatively how the obtained ex-
ponent relies on the entropy of the message source as well as Eve’s prior information about
the key source.
3. We adopt a key extractor that samples a data frame from thispartially secure key source
and then utilizes an extractor to obtain the cipher key with the required Rényi entropy. All
existing extractors measure the extracted randomness in terms of statistical distance from
uniformity [97]. In our scheme privacy amplification is based on an uncertainty measures
using Rényi entropy, and hence we develop a new notion of extractor that extracts the re-
quired randomness on the basis of Rényi entropy. What is notable is that Rényi entropy is a
stronger secrecy measure compared to statistical distance.
4. For a particular case where source messages consist of indepe ently and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d) symbols, we optimize the Rényi entropy order to maximize the lower-bound
for secrecy exponent. We characterize the required key generation rate that guarantees achiev-
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able secrecy for both secrecy layers. For the second layer that is used for transmission of
highly confidential part of the message, secrecy is determined i terms of decreasing expo-
nent of information leakage measured by variational distance and mutual information. For
the first layer used for regular message transmission, secrecy is measured in terms of adver-
sary’s error probability in cryptanalysis also called decryption error probability.
In [4] a similar analysis is used where encryption in utilized to provide underlying secrecy
measured in terms of correct decryption probability over which by applying privacy amplification
a higher level of secrecy is built up measured in terms of distinguishing security. What mainly
distinguishes our work from Bellare et.al. work in [4] is thathere we also reach to the goal of
exponential secrecy where Eve’s advantage vanishes at expon ntial rate, and moreover unlike their
work we do not rely on any physical channel error.
In Section 4.2 the whole scheme of design as well as denotations are illustrated. Section 4.3 dis-
cusses a construction of universal2 hashing that is utilized in this work. Key extractor and cipher are
described and analyzed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. Privacy amplification and exponent
analysis based on mutual information and variational distance metrics are detailed in Section 4.6.
Numerical analysis and optimization based on dual mode transmission are presented in Section
4.7, and then we conclude in Section 4.8. Proofs for this Chapter are also given in Appendix.
4.2 Proposed Secrecy Scheme model
The transmitter and the receiver side of our proposed secrecy scheme are shown in Fig. 4.1 and 4.2
respectively. We assume that there exists a source of information denoted byV about which Eve
has a lower-bounded uncertainty measured in terms of Rényi entropy. Key extractor module that
is shown in Fig. 4.3 is used to derive nearly uniform secret key from this weakly random source
of data. By independently sampling a segment of this source attime i we obtain a data frameΛi
that will have the required randomness given Eve’s knowledge in terms of Rényi entropy. We show
that a keyQi can be extracted out ofΛi, by using extractor based on universal hashing, with Rényi
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FIGURE 4.1. Transmitter side in the proposed secrecy scheme
FIGURE 4.2. Receiver side in the proposed secrecy scheme
entropy that is asymptotically close to the maximum value. This generated key can be used as a
symmetric key for encryption in a general cipher.
Consider a uniformly distributed and randomly chosen function from a universal class of hash
functions that is applied upon a source of data with a sufficient equivocation (conditional Rényi
entropy given Eve’s knowledge). It is proven in [58, 63] thatthe generated output hash value will
have exponentially decreasing information leakage measurd in terms of mutual information orL1
norm distance from uniform distribution.
FIGURE 4.3. Key extractor from a weakly random source
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As shown in Fig. 4.1, the secure transmission mechanism is applied over a sequence ofl blocks
with the size ofb-symbols. As convention a message block at timei is shown asAi, with symbols of
{Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aib}. A sequence ofl concatenated blocks is denoted asA(l) = {A1, A2, . . . , Al}. In-
verse universal hash maps this sequence into a sequence of plaintext blocks{X1, X2, . . . , X l} us-
ing the same random seedS that is publicly known and a sequence of random vectors{R1, R2, . . . , Rl}
that are uniformly generated. In our scheme we consider an invert ble universal hash function based
on modulon multiplication inGF (qn). Inverse universal hash maps its input into its pre-image
that increases its length by adding some randomness throughbinning. This mapping has a simi-
lar functionality as the homophonic encoder in approach proposed in [73] or the random binning
based encoding proposed by Wyner and Ciszar in [1, 9]. However, our adopted inverse universal
hashing can be considered as a particular encoding approachtailored to Eve’s uncertainty over the
key source.
Each of the generatedn-symbol plaintext blocks at the output of inverse universalhash function
will be encrypted independently using a general cipher. Thecipher is comprised of a key stream
generator to derive key streamC i from this keyQi as well as a combiner that combines this key
stream with the plaintext blockX i. For i = 1, . . . , l, this encryption results in a sequence of
ciphertextsY (l) = {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y l}, that will be transmitted to Bob and eavesdropped by Eve.
Key extractor and the cipher constitute the first layer of secrecy that ensures sufficient equiv-
ocation of plaintext blocks provided that the extracted keyhas the required Rényi entropy. Upon
receiving these ciphertexts, Bob has the same initial key sourceV and uses inverse mappings to
recover the plaintext sequenceX(l) = {X1, X2, . . . , X l} with a sufficient equivocation. As will be
stated in Theorems 7 and 8, after applying the universal hashover this sequence, Eve’s information




We adopt universal hashing for privacy amplification and keyextraction. An ensemble of the func-
tionshs that maps setΩ to {1, . . . ,M}, whereS determines statistical behavior of the functionh,
is called universal2 when it satisfies the following conditions [93]:
Condition 1:∀x1 6= x2 ∈ Ω, the probability thaths(x1) = hs(x2) is at most 1M .
Condition 2:For anyS, the cardinality ofh−1s {i} is independent of the inputi.
To make this concrete we give an example of a universal2 h sh function with an efficiently
computable inverter that can be used for key derivation and privacy amplification in our scheme.
The construction was used in [4] as randomness extractor. Here, we use a more general symbol-
wise format of this construction. If we interpretn-symbol strings as elements of the finite field
GF(qn), we shall define a multiplication operator⊙ on them. Let setΩ be {0, . . . , q − 1} and
consider seedS that is drawn uniformly from the setSD = Ωn\0n. We define the universal hash
functionh : SD × Ωn → Ωb that operates on inputsX ∈ Ωn andS ∈ SD to output the first
truncatedb-symbols ofX ⊙ S asA = h(X,S) = truncb(X ⊙ S).
LetS−1 be the inverse ofS with respect to multiplication in GF(qn). Then, we can efficiently in-
vert this universal hashing by the functionh−1 : SD×Ωn−b×Ωb → Ωn defined ash−1(S,R,A) =
(A||R) ⊙ S−1, for R uniform overΩn−b. In Appendix 6.7 we show that both conditions 1 and 2
hold for this function, meaning that in addition to uniformity of the the output hash value, every
point in the range has the same number of preimages.
4.4 Key Extractor
With the existence of an initial key source that contains some good amount of randomness but is
non-uniformly distributed or partially known by Eve, we need to design a key extracting function
based on essential cryptographic components that derives required keys from this imperfect source
with a randomness close to uniform. The assumption on existence of such a source was also used
in some key extracting techniques like [6, 10]. This random data can be produced through different
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means such as hardware devices based on thermal noise, statistical sampling of user’s keyboard
strokes or timing data obtained from the hard disk or packet transmission in a network [6].
Consider random variableV common between Alice and Bob, consisting ofν random variables
asV = (V1, V2, . . . , Vν) that is used as initial keying source. This keying sourceV gathered by
users has to contain enough uncertainty at Eve’s side in terms of Rényi entropy of order 2 denoted
byH2(V ). As shown in Fig. 4.3 the first step in key extractor is a sampling module that each time
independently samples aλ-tuple from this source such that each symbol can only be sampled once.
For anyλ-tuple i = (i1, i2, . . . , iλ) with 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < . . . < iλ ≤ ν let Vi be the sampled string
(Vi1 , Vi2 , . . . , Viλ). Then, it is shown in [98] that
H2(Vi) ≥ H2(V )− (ν − λ). (4.1)
ForH2(V )− (ν − λ) = δ if we denote the randomly sampledλ-tuple string at timei asΛi, it will
have collision entropy of at leastδ. Rényi entropy is a decreasing function with respect to its order
[20], soH1+α(Λi) ≥ H2(Λi) ≥ δ for 0 < α ≤ 1, and Eve’s uncertainty about the sampled output
in terms of Rényi entropy of order1 + α will be at leastδ.
Randomness extractors are well suited to address the need forkey derivation functionality which
maps input distributions with sufficient entropy into outputs with distributions statistically close
to uniform [97]. To the best of authors’ knowledge, so far alldefinitions of extractors measure
randomness of the extracted output on the basis of statisticl distance from uniformity. However,
since in our scheme privacy amplification is characterized based on Rényi entropy, we need to
develop a new notion of extractor that extracts randomness in terms of Rényi entropy. Therefore,
we resort to the use of cryptographic hash functions as the basis for such extractor. We prove the
following Theorem in Appendix 6.8.
Theorem 5. Consider a universal class of hash functionshs : Ω → K; whereS is uniform over
SD. If we applyhs over inputX ∈ Ω with Rényi entropy ofH1+α(X) ≥ δ, for 0 < α ≤ 1,
the generated hash valueQ = hs(X) such thatQ ∈ K attains Rényi entropy with the following
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lower-bound




Now, we can define the new notion of Rényi extractor:
Definition 2. RenExt:Ω×SD → K is a (δ, ε) Rény extractor if for every seedS uniformly chosen
on SD and every sourceX ∈ Ω of Rényi entropyH2(X) ≥ δ, it holds that RenExt(X,S) has
Rényi entropy of at leastlog |K| − ε.
Rényi extractor based on universal hashing results in entropy lossε which is exponentially de-
creasing. By applying this Rényi extractor over sampled data fr meΛi which has Rényi entropy of
at leastδ, provided thatδ > log |K|, we obtain a keyQi ∈ K with Rény entrpy
H1+α(Q
i) ≥ log |K| − 1
α
e−α[δ−log |K|] = log |K| − ε. (4.3)
If we adopt universal hashing technique based on⊙ multiplication in GF(qn) for key extraction,
we need to use independent seeds for each key derivation. It ensures that then due to independent
sampling and mapping used in key extractor the generated keys will be independent of each other.
4.5 Cipher
Consider a deterministic cipher that consists of a key streamgenerator and a combiner. Let the
plaintext block at timei beX i = (X i1, X
i




j ∈ Ω. The key extractor output isQi
that takes values in the setK with total of enRs elements. At timei key stream generator maps the
input keyQi to the key stream of lengthn, C i = (C i1, C
i
2, . . . , C
i
n) with components from the set
Ω using the mappingΦ : K → Ωn. We define the cipher as the setC∗ = {C1, C2, . . . , CenRs} of




For i = 1, . . . , l the cipher produces the ciphertext blockY i from theith plaintext blockX i and
theith key streamC i using the combinerf(., .) that mapsΩn × Ωn → Ωn.
Y i = f(X i, C i) i = 1, 2, · · · . (4.4)
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Bob is aware of the keyQi used at timei and can generate the same key streamC i using key
stream generator. He applies inverse mappingg(., .) to the received ciphertext blockC i in order to
recover the plaintext blockX i, whereg : Ωn × Ωn → Ωn andX i = g(Y i, C i). Depending on the
mappingf , the cipher could be block, stream cipher, or additive-likecipher.
Now the question is how much Eve knows about the plaintext. She has knowledge about the
system and all the mappings and can receive ciphertexts. However, she lacks a complete knowl-
edge, thereby resulting in uncertainty about the cipher key. We use the following Lemma, proven
in Appendix 6.9, in Theorem 6 to quantify equivocation of theplaintext in terms of Rényi entropy.
Lemma 6. For conditional Rényi entropy of order1 + α with α > 0 we have
H1+α(X|Y ) ≥ H1+α(X, Y )−H(Y ). (4.5)
Theorem 6. LetX = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn), Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn) andC = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn) be ran-
dom vectors representing plaintext block, ciphertext block and the key stream, respectively, where
Xi, Yi, Ci ∈ Ω. LetQ denote the random vector representing the key. Forα > 0, equivocation of
the plaintext satisfies
H1+α(X|Y ) ≥ H1+α(X) +H1+α(Q)− n log |Ω|. (4.6)
Proof. LetH1+α(X, Y ) be the joint Rényi entropy of the plaintext and ciphertext. Sincef(., .) is
a one-to-one mapping, it is easy to see thatH1+α(X, Y ) = H1+α(X,C). But we know that the
key streamC is independent of the input plaintextX implying thatH1+α(X,C) = H1+α(X) +
H1+α(C). Moreover, key stream generator that uses mappingΦ does not increase entropy against
adversary and therefore Eve’s lack of knowledge about the keyQ will be transformed to her uncer-
tainty about the key streamC, i.e.H1+α(C) = H1+α(Q). ForY ∈ Ωn we haveH(Y ) ≤ n log |Ω|.
Then, using by Eq. (4.5) gives us the equivocation of order1 + α.
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In our secrecy analysis we will only consider0 < α ≤ 1. To measure redundancy of the input
plaintextX we use Rényi divergence of order1 + α asD1+α(PX ||P̃X) where P̃X is uniform
distribution overΩn. If we define normalized redundancy ofX asdXα , D1+α(PX ||P̃X)/n, we
will have
H1+α(X) = n log |Ω| − ndXα . (4.7)
As a result, we can rewrite Eq. (4.6) as
H1+α(X|Y ) ≥ H1+α(Q)− ndXα . (4.8)
The key generation rateRs has to be specified in order to guarantee the required secrecyfor
the first layer of the scheme including the cipher and key extractor. It aims at a minimum required
equivocation for Eve about the message that can be characterized in terms of the average error
probability in Eve’s estimation of the plaintext block. LetX∗ be the estimate of adversary from
the plaintext blockX based on the maximum aposteriori probability (MAP) given the received
ciphertextY asX∗ = maxX∈Ωn Pr[X|Y ]. MAP decision rule minimizes the average probability
of error per plaintext block defined as
Pe = 1− EY [max
X∈Ωn
Pr(X|Y )]. (4.9)
As it is proven in [99], Rényi entropy can be used to bound errorp bability of MAP decision rule
based on an analogue of Fano’s lemma that is stated below:
Theorem 6 in [99]: LetP be the set of aposteriori probabilities asP = {P1, P2, . . . , Pm}, and
Hβ(P ) be the conditional Rényi entropy that is defined based onP . Let estimation error probability











In plaintext estimation by adversary, with aposteriori probability of Pr(X|Y ) and estimation
error probability given in Eq. (4.9), noting thatX belongs to the alphabet of size|Ω|n , we can
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obtain the upper-bound for conditional Rényi entropy of order 1 + α with 0 < α ≤ 1 as










, α > 0. (4.11)
We adopt error probability of attacker in estimation of the plaintext block using MAP as the secrecy
metric for the first layer of the scheme. Such metric was also used in previous works [66, 68] as
secrecy criterion. Let us determine a threshold asP the and design the system with a key stream
generation rate assuring that Eve’s block error probability exceeds this threshold. It is easy to see
that for0 < α ≤ 1, h̄1+α(Pe) is a monotonic increasing function ofPe. In other words, if we ensure
that h̄1+α(P the ) ≤ H1+α(X|Y ) due to inequality (4.11) and monotonic behavior ofh̄1+α(Pe) we
will have h̄1+α(Pe) ≥ h̄1+α(P the ) that infersPe ≥ P the . Let τα , h̄1+α(P the ), so we need to make
sure that equivocation in Eq. (4.8) never drops belowτα, which requires that
H1+α(Q)− ndXα ≥ τα. (4.12)
If we use our proposed key extracting technique,H1+α(Q) can be lower-bounded according to Eq.
(4.2). Then, for the above inequality to hold we need to have




Hence, we can infer that key stream generation rate has to be







It characterizes the minimum required key rate for the first layer of secrecy. Note that we require
δ > log |K|.
4.6 Privacy Amplification
4.6.1 Secrecy Exponent Analysis Based on Mutual Information
The main objective of using universal hashing in our scheme is bringing secrecy up to the second
layer by privacy amplification. Leths be an ensemble of universal hash functions that maps set
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Ωn to {1, . . . ,M} and satisfies both conditions 1 and 2. As proven in [58], information leakage in
terms of mutual information, averaged over possible seedsS, satisfies





So we can find a functionhs from Ωn to {1, . . . ,M} that





whereY denotes the obtained knowledge by Eve. Eq. (4.16) implies that w en legitimate users
have a common randomness denoted byX with equivocation of at leastH1+α(X|Y ), we can
make sure that the upper-bound for Eve’s knowledge about theoutput ofhs(X) decreases with the
exponent ofα(H1+α(X|Y ) − logM). The larger this exponent is, the closer system secrecy will
be to the perfect secrecy with zero information leakage, i.e. I(hs(X);Y ) = 0.
In our scheme Alice and Bob exchange random vectorX through encryption that enables them
to have a shared body of random data with equivocation ofH1+α(X|Y ). As the next step if we
apply the universal hash function based on⊙ multiplication in GF(qn), that mapsΩn to Ωb, it can
be assured that outputA = hs(X) will have information leakage with the decreasing exponent
of at leastα(H1+α(X|Y ) − logM), for M = |Ωb|. Now if we reverse this process and obtainX
from inputA using inverse universal hash that mapsΩb to Ωn, we will get the same results since
condition 2 guarantees that the cardinality|h−1s (A)| does not depend onA. Let Alice generate
uniformly random stringR overΩn−b and apply inverse functionh−1s over the inputA,R andS
−1
to obtain plaintextX = (A||R)⊙S−1. Then, decreasing exponent of information leakage aboutA
will be at leastα(H1+α(X|Y )− logM).
Considerl-fold scenario of the abovementioned mechanism where inputmessage is framed
into a sequence ofl blocks denoted byA(l) = {A1, A2, . . . , Al} for Ai ∈ Ωb. Alice generates
the sequence ofl uniformly random(n − b)-symbol stringsR(l) = {R1, R2, . . . , Rl}, and then
by using inverse universal hash, outputsX i = (Ai||Ri) ⊙ S−1, to mapA(l) to the sequence of
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plaintextsX(l) = {X1, X2, . . . , X l}. Through encryption using the sequence ofl key streams
C(l) = {C1, C2, . . . , C l} that are generated using the cipher keys{Q1, Q2, . . . , Ql}, X(l) will be
mapped to the sequence of ciphertextsY (l) = {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y l} asY i = f(X i, C i). LetA(l) ∈ I.









= log |Ωb| = logM. (4.17)
At the receiver end after deciphering and recovering ofX(l) that containsl plaintext blocks,
universal hashing will be applied over them to restore message blocks asAi = truncb(X i ⊙ S).
Note that the same seedS, uniformly chosen overΩn, is used for hashing of all blocks that
has to be publicly known before their transmission. We definemutual information based secrecy





− log I(h(l)(X(l));Y (l))
l
, (4.18)
whose lower-bound is given in the following Theorem:
Theorem 7. Let random variableA represent the message block of sizeb with components in set
Ω whereM = |Ωb| andQ represent the cipher key. Then, for the describedl-fold transmission





α(H1+α(Q) +H1+α(A)− 2 logM). (4.19)
Proof. SinceRi andAi are independent ofRj andAj for i 6= j, for a givenS, X i andXj will be
independent of each other. Namely, revealing any information about any of the plaintexts does not
assist Eve to reduce her uncertainty about other ones. Consequently, we shall write
H1+α(X
(l)|Y (l)) = lH1+α(X i|Y i) = lH1+α(X|Y ). (4.20)
We use Cartesian product construction of universal class of hash functions in order to enlarge the
domain of hash family. In this construction hashed outputs,that are generated using hash function
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with the same seed, are concatenated, where(l)(X(l)) is defined ashs(X1)||hs(X2)|| . . . ||hs(X l).
Stinson showed in [100] that Cartesian product based universal hashing denoted byh(l) results in
the same collision probability ashs. Namely, using only one seed forl transformations does not
compromise security.
At receiverl-fold universal hash functionh(l) mapsX(l) to A(l). Joint distribution ofX(l) and
Y (l) denoted byPX(l),Y (l) can be obtained byl-fold identical and independent distribution ofPX,Y
as(PX,Y )l, so we can infer from Eq. (4.20) that
















α(H1+α(X|Y )− logM). (4.22)
Based on the secrecy analysis for the first layer of the scheme which is constituted of the cipher and
the key extractor, we obtained equivocation of each plaintext block in Eq. (4.8). On the other hand,
redundancy of the plaintext can be quantified in terms of entropy of the message block from which
it is derived using inverted universal hashing. Random vector R is of sizen − b with components
in the setΩ meaning thatR is uniformly generated overΩn−b. For a given seedS, distribution of
random vectorX that is obtained asX = (A||R)⊙ S−1 is determined based on the distribution of
R and inputA that are independent of each other. As a result,
PX(X|S) = PA(A).PR(R) =
PR(A)
|Ω|n−b . (4.23)
Thus, we can compute Rényi entropy of the plaintextX
H1+α(X) = (n− b) log |Ω|+H1+α(A). (4.24)
Replacing Eq. (4.6) in this Eq. shows that equivocation satisfies
H1+α(X|Y ) ≥ H1+α(Q) +H1+α(A)− logM. (4.25)
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Then, substituting it in Eq. (4.22) gives us the desired lower bound of the secrecy exponent in Eq.
(4.19).
Eq. (4.19) indicates that the decreasing exponent of information leakage depends only on the
entropy of the generated key, uncertainty about the source message as well as the random number
generation rate. Note that initial sourceV will be used for encryption ofl blocks such thatl keys
has to be derived out ofl timesλ-tuple sampling of it, therefore its lengthν should satisfyν ≥ lλ.
To have positive secrecy exponent for a source with the entropy ofH1+α(A), extracted key entropy
for single block encryption has to be at least
H1+α(Q) ≥ 2 logM −H1+α(A). (4.26)
By replacing the entropy for extracted key given in Eq. (4.2),and definingγ , δ− log |K|, we get
the following requirement for key size
log |K| ≥ 2 logM + 1
α
e−γ −H1+α(A) where γ > 0. (4.27)
This condition guarantees exponential security for highlyconfidential message transmission.
4.6.2 Secrecy Exponent Analysis Based onL1 distance
We use Eve’s distinguishability as the second metric to characte ize leaked information. Hayashi
in [63] adopted it as secrecy criterion that is close to the universal composable security used in [7].
Consider an ensemble of functionshs that maps the random numberX ∈ Ωn to {1, 2, . . . ,M}
satisfying both universality conditions. Alice and Bob apply the same function to the common
random variableX to obtainhs(X). LetY ∈ Ω be the random variable representing Eve’s knowl-
edge wherePhs(X),Y denotes the joint distribution ofhs(X) andY . Let P̃hs(X) be the uniform
distribution on{1, 2, . . . ,M}. Eve’s distinguishability is defined [63] as
d1(Phs(X),Y |Y ) = d1(Phs(X),Y , P̃hs(X) × PY ). (4.28)
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According to Eq. (1.2) it can be rewritten as
d1(Phs(X),Y |Y ) =
∑
y
PY (y)d1(Phs(X)|Y=y, P̃hs(X)). (4.29)
It measures randomness of the output value of a particular hash functionhs from Eve’s perspective
in terms ofL1 distance from the uniform distribution, averaged over Eve’s possible knowledge
Y . If we average this distance over all possible seedsS ∈ SD, when the resulted value is suffi-
ciently small, we can be certain thaths(X) is independent of random variablesS andY . Thus, the
generated random variable will be suitable even when we randomly choose the hash function.













whereEs denotes expectation in terms of the random variableS. As a result, there exists a function
hs such that






This equation implies that when equivocation ofX is larger than the random number generation
rate,logM , distribution of the generated random variablehs(X) asymptotically approaches to uni-
formity. Consider our two layer secrecy scheme in which inverse ofl-fold universal hash function
h(l), using the same publicly known seed, maps a sequence of message blocksA(l) to a sequence of
plaintext blocksX(l). We define decreasing exponent ofL1 distance of generated secret messages





− log d1(Ph(l)(X(l)),Y (l) |Y (l))
l
, (4.31)
whose lower-bound can be characterized using Theorem 8:
Theorem 8. Let random variableA represent the message block of sizeb with components in the
setΩ whereM = |Ωb|, andQ represent the cipher key. Then, for the proposed secrecy scheme with
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α(H1+α(Q) +H1+α(A)− 2 logM)
1 + α
. (4.32)
Proof. At receiver l-fold universal hash functionh(l) generates the message sequenceA(l) that
belongs to the setI where|I| = |Ωb|l. By using Eq.’s (4.20) and (4.30) we write












For the random number generation rate ofρ = logM whereM = |Ωb|, we can obtain decreasing








Random variableX represents the plaintext blocks that are generated by the inverse universal hash
operation and then encrypted using the cipher, giving them equivocation obtained in Eq. (4.25).
Substituting it in Eq. (4.33) completes the proof.
As a result, if we use the proposed key extractor to derive cipher keys, the same condition in
Eq. (4.27) needs to hold to have information leakage in termsof variational distance or Eve’s
distinguishability decay exponentially to zero.
4.6.3 Comparison Between Bounds and Metrics
First of all, we compare two bounds presented for the exponent of i formation leakage, one based
on mutual information in Eq. (4.22) and the other one based onL1 distance in Eq. (4.33). Mutual
information between two random variablesX andY can be written in terms of KL divergence
I(X;Y ) = D(PX,Y ||P̃X × PY ). (4.34)






logD(Ph(l)(X(l)),Y (l) ||P̃h(l)(X(l)) × PY (l)) ≥ max
0<α≤1
α(H1+α(X|Y )− logM), (4.35)
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However, this bound is smaller than the lower-bound we used to characterize exponent of informa-
tion leakage in terms of variational distance, implying that the bound in Eq. (4.33) is tighter than
the one for mutual information in Eq. (4.22). Moreover, these two bounds become equivalent when
α that maximizes the lower-bound in Eq. (4.33) is equal to 1.
On the other hand, If we compare these two metrics, based on the equivalence of mutual infor-
mation and KL-distance and inequality (1.7), we infer that
1
2
log I(h(l)(X(l));Y (l)) ≥ log d1(Ph(l)(X(l)),Y (l) |Y (l)). (4.37)
This inequality indicates that whenever system is secure from mutual information point of view,
and the left hand side is smaller than a sufficiently small number, the right hand side will also
be upper-bounded making information leakage in terms of variational distance negligible. Not to
mention that mutual information is a stronger metric compared toL1 distance. Nevertheless, the
main reason that makes variational distance a more suitablesecrecy metric from cryptographic
perspective is that it simplifies formulation for practicalanalysis of any protocol environment and
can be augmented with practical notions of secrecy like Eve’s distinuishability.
4.7 Optimization and Analysis of dual mode transmission
mechanism
As discussed in previous sections the proposed secrecy scheme provides exponential secrecy if
privacy amplification is applied on top of the cipher with thestipulation on the key length that
is formulated in Eq. (4.27). It implies that there exists a trade-off such that exponential secrecy
that guarantees a higher level of secrecy requires a relativly high key rate. On the other hand,
only highly confidential part of the message requires exponential secrecy and a higher key rate,
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FIGURE 4.4. Dual mode transmission with two layers of secrecy
whereas normally it is not demanded in regular transmission. As a result, we design a dual mode
transmission mechanism depicted in Fig. 4.4 that, depending on the demanded level of secrecy for
transmission, switches to either encryption or privacy amplification (PA) mode.
For analysis, we consider special case with binary i.i.d. message source such thatΩ = {0, 1}. For
regular and efficient transmission that does not require additional security, transmission mechanism
switches to encryption mode where input message is framed into n-bit blocks and then encrypted
by a cipher. For this layer of secrecy, we adopt Eve’s probability of failure in estimating the correct
plaintext block as the secrecy criterion. Such error probability was also considered as a metric to
measure security in [66, 68]. As discussed in Section 4.5 average block error probability of Eve
denoted byPe exceeds the required thresholdP the if the required condition for the length of the
extracted key in Eq. (4.13) is satisfied.
In encryption mode each plaintext block is equivalent ton-bit message block. Let us represent
a plaintext block with random vectorX ∈ {0, 1}n whose componentsXi, for i = 1, . . . , n, are
independently and identically generated Bernoulli random variables withPr(Xi = 1) = p. It is




log[p1+α + (1− p)1+α]. (4.38)
As a result, normalized redundancy ofdXα can be written according to Eq. (4.8) as
dXα = log |Ω|+
1
α
log[p1+α + (1− p)1+α]. (4.39)
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Therefore, the minimum required key length for encryption mode given in Eq. (4.13) will be a
function ofp, n, P the , α andγ that we denote asΓe(p, n, P
th
e , α, γ).
As shown in Fig. 4.4 when a part of message requires a higher lev l of secrecy, transmission
mechanism switches to PA mode where the message source is encapsulated intob-bit blocks, and
then a sequence ofl concatenated message blocks will be mapped to a sequence of plaintext blocks
using inverse universal hashing. In Section 4.6 we obtainedth lower-bound for decreasing expo-
nent of information leakage in Eq. (4.19) that has to be maximized in terms of the order of Rényi
entropy to have the highest possible decreasing rate for infrmation leakage. Considering i.i.d. mes-
sage source whose components are Bernoulli random variableswith probabilityp, and extracted
cipher key whose entropy is given in Eq. (4.2), we can obtain the lower-bound for the decreasing
exponent as
GI(α, γ, p) = α(log |K| − 2 logM)− e−αγ − b log[p1+α + (1− p)1+α], (4.40)
whereγ = δ − log |K|. We need to maximizeGI(α, γ, p) with respect toα where0 < α ≤
1. δ is the minimum entropy of the sampled data frame from which key Q was extracted. To
extract key we need to haveγ > 0, i.e. for a largerk, largerδ would be needed. Therefore, in our
numerical analysis we make this assumption thatγ takes a constant positive value. As a result, the
optimization problem can be formulated as
max
0<α≤1
GI(α, γ, p), where γ > 0 and GI(α, γ, p) > 0.
We use numerical optimization through an exhaustive searchover0 < α∗ ≤ 1 with the step size
of 10−4, and denote the optimized order asα∗ and the maximized lower-bound asGmaxI . As the
secrecy requirement for PA mode, we determine a threshold for secrecy exponent asGthI and find
the minimum required cipher key length for whichGmaxI ≥ GthI as




−α∗γ + b log[p1+α
∗
+ (1− p)1+α∗ ]
)
+ 2 logM. (4.41)
We denote this required lower-bound for key length in PA modeasΓpa(p, b, GthI , α
∗, γ).
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FIGURE 4.5. Security rate in different modes with different metrics
ConsideringL1 norm distance as secrecy metric, according to Eq. (4.32), functionG1 represent-
ing the lower bound for decreasing exponent of information leakage turns out to be




α(log |K| − 2 logM)− e−αγ − b log[p1+α + (1− p)1+α]
)
. (4.42)
Similarly G1 can be maximized for0 < α ≤ 1 andG1 > 0. Then, for optimizedα∗, if we
determine the required threshold forGmax1 asG
th
1 , we can obtain the requirement for the key length
to haveGmax1 ≥ Gth1 as:
log |K| ≥ 1
α
(
(1 + α)Gth1 + e
−α∗γ + b log[p1+α
∗
+ (1− p)1+α∗ ]
)
+ 2 logM. (4.43)
Let security rate be the minimum required key length for transmission of each message symbol
or bit with the required security. In encryption mode cipherk ys are generated per message block of
lengthn-bit, hence security rate that meets the secrecy requirement is Γe(p, n, P the , α, γ)/n. In PA
mode each generated key is applied per message block of length b-bit, therefore security rate will
be Γpa(b, α∗, p, γ,GthI )/b. Fig. 4.5 depicts security rate in terms of varying Bernoulliparameter
0 < p < 0.5 for i.i.d. input binary distribution. It shows security rates that in PA mode satisfy
the required lower-bound for secrecy exponent based on mutual information (denoted byrIpa) or
variational distance (denoted byr1pa). It also illustrates security rate in encryption mode thatis
denoted byre that meets the demanded block error rate for cryptanalyst.GthI is chosen to be8 and
Gth1 is set to be half of it due to the inequality (4.37), meanwhilewe selectP
th
e to be1− 10−4. The
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required security rate for PA mode is much higher than encryption mode. As can be seen, in PA
mode forp = 0.05 the required security rate is relatively high about1.35 while with increase inp,
it goes down to0.735. Note that the results obtained for both metrics in PA mode are almost the
same with slight differences for0.05 < p < 0.3. That is because mutual information is a stronger
metric compared toL1 distance, and has a looser lower bound that will require a slightly higher
security rate to meet the secrecy requirement.
When both modes of operations are utilized in dual transmission mechanism, it is necessary to
simultaneously satisfy their demanded secrecy. That allows us to use the same key stream genera-
tion rateRs defined as
log |K|
n






∗, γ),Γe(p, n, P
th
e , α, γ)
]
/n.
Fig. 4.6 shows how required key stream rate for dual mode transmission varies with respect to
the parameterp of input binary distribution and conversion rate of inverseuniversal hashing (b/n).
Note that low conversion rate indicates that more redundancy is added through inverse hashing.
Exponential secrecy in PA mode is much stronger than the error p obability metric in encryption
mode, so in most areas key length is determined by the secrecyiterion in PA mode. However,
in circled area the necessary key stream rate is determined based on the secrecy requirement of
encryption mode. That is because for low conversion rate (b is much smaller than ) and low
source entropy (lowp) the required key length for strong secrecy ofb-bit message in PA mode
might not be sufficient even for weak secrecy ofn-bit message in encryption mode.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we designed a secrecy system, based on a general cipher as the first layer and pri-
vacy amplification as the second layer, that is exponentially secure, namely, its information leakage
decays at exponential rate. Without resorting to any physical channel condition or restriction on
Eve’s resources, the only advantage that we considered for legitimate users was a key source that
is partially known by Eve. A key extracting module derives keys from this source about which
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FIGURE 4.6. Required key stream generation rate in dual mode transmission
Eve has the required uncertainty. We characterized and optimized the lower bound for decreasing
exponent of information leakage called secrecy exponent interms of Eve’s information and dis-
tinguishability. Then, it is adopted as the criterion to determine the minimum required key length
for encryption. In numerical analysis we considered a dual mode transmission mechanism with





5.1 Multiuser and Asynchronous Key Scheduling
In Chapter 3 we considered a protocol in which the legitimate users are100% confident about the
shared randomness by utilizing the proposed synchronization scheme. However, in many appli-
cations there can be some synchronization errors between two parties, and since they both need
to apply a privacy amplification technique over the generated common randomness that can be
erroneous, the derived secret keys will be different that causes decryption error when these keys
are used for symmetric encryption. Moreover, approaches that require complete synchronization
between two parties will result in a higher communication overhead and lower secrecy throughput.
As a result, if we relax the requirement of absolute agreement between targeted recipient and the
transmitter by allowing bounded error pattern for shared data while still generating the same key,
we can achieve a secure key which consequently produces a higher secrecy throughput with a less
expenditure and overhead. Hence, we need to find a random extraction method, that with a similar
input but with a margin of difference from the original one, generates the same key. Moreover, the
effect of relaxed requirements in synchronization needs to be illustrated in improvement of system
efficiency.
In Chapter 3 to simplify the secrecy analysis problem, we assumed there exists a virtual oracle
giving Eve information regarding where she has lost her alignment with users. Nevertheless, for
rigorous analysis we should note that in reality there does not necessarily exist such an oracle,
so we will need to either adopt analysis based on a new metric or completely analyze possibility
of realignment. In addition, the mapping algorithm, that we proposed in this work to cause error
propagation for Eve, results in a constant distance between the original set and her destination set
after resynchronizations of her OTF with users’ set. If we assume that Eve is able to guess where
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she has got back her OTF synchronization, she will be able to find this constant distance for the
rest of her destination set, remove it from her set and consequently obtain a set with a much lower
Hamming distance from the actual set and with a less entropy about the generated key. Therefore, a
new way of analysis and a new metric or some modification in generating the key and randomness
is required to address these issues with a more concrete analysis.
With increasing application of point to multipoint communication over broadcast links such as
file distribution, teleconferencing and video text systems, thi trend will continue in future commu-
nications. Due to poor throughput efficiency of pure stop andwait ARQ protocols in systems where
channel round trip delay is large, and where there are a largenumber of receivers, they can not be
used in systems like satellite broadcast channels. In otherwords, if we try to extend our proposed
secrecy approach in Chapter 3 to broadcast communications, we will need to change it in a way that
can fit in the new channel conditions. Overall, a new or modifieapproach for generating secret
keys that tolerates a margin of errors between legitimate users and meanwhile generates a highly
secure key with a higher throughput is needed. This system should also be designed for sharing
secret keys between a base station and multiple users with a hgh secrecy and data efficiency.
5.1.1 Problem with the Proposed Mapping Strategy
In Chapter 3 we discussed about a mapping strategy based on thefirs order IIR filter that can be
used to map the generated OTF set into another set called destination set about which Eve will have
a higher uncertainty. Then, we can make sure that every missing or wrong OTF packet behaves like
an additive noise that propagates for the rest of packets in Eve’s destination set after misdetection.
The problem is that if we use first order mapping, every noisy packet will contribute with a constant
weight for the difference between Eve’s destination set andthe original set. Accordingly, Eve
needs to simply estimate this constant difference and errorbetween these two sets in order to
recover the original set. To prevent Eve from successfully mounting such kind of attack in guessing
possible packets that act like additive noise in her destinatio set, we may need to design a more
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sophisticated mapping strategy that minimizes the possibility of error estimation by Eve. In this
new mapping strategy we should take into account that misdetected packets should contribute with
varying weight in error propagation of Eve’s set to further intensify her confusion.
5.2 Proposed Approach
5.2.1 Asynchronous Key Agreement Based on Fuzzy Extractors and Edit
Distance
In [59] a key generation technique is proposed based on fuzzyextractors that extract a uniformly
random stringR from its inputw. This extraction is error-tolerant such thatR will be the same
even when the input changes, as long as it remains within a cert in distance from the original. To
assist in recoveringR from w′, fuzzy extractor produces a public stringP . However, still given
P , R remains uniformly random. As a result, if we design our scheme in a way that with a fewer
transmissions or overheads, the distance between gatheredrandom data for both partners is upper-
bounded, we can use fuzzy extractor to derive the same keys for them. Since fuzzy extractor toler-
ates errors within this upper-bound of distance between twoinputs, with the help of public string
equivalent keys with a high min-entropy can be generated, tomake sure that with a higher secret
key rate the required level of secrecy can be achieved.
If we consider possibility of errors in the proposed scheme in Chapter 3, every mistake in putting
a wrong packet in OTF or missing an OTF packet can cause a misalignment between two parties
and make the rest of their sets different. Thus, in this case it is not appropriate to use Hamming
distance as a metric to measure distance between two strings. We therefore need to tailor to a metric
that measures distance based on insertion and deletion of packets. In [59] Hamming distance, edit
distance as well as set difference are used to measure distance from the original input data. Edit
distance betweenw andw′ is defined to be one half of the smallest number of character ins rtions
and deletions needed to transformw intow′. If we use edit distance instead of Hamming distance
to measure the difference between two gathered random string by Alice and Bob, we do not need
to worry about asynchronization between them since what needs to be measured is the number of
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packets inserted or deleted to transform one set to another.In [59] a fuzzy extractor based on edit
distance is constructed that allows creation of the same keys when edit distance of two sets is less
than a threshold.
In this new context of using fuzzy extractors, we need to makesur that with a high probability
Eve’s gathered string will have a higher edit distance than te determined threshold. Due to using
a new difference metric, no longer can misalignment be a problem for Eve, yet what really matters
here is the number of mistakes that she probably makes by OTF packet missing or false OTF
packet error. Thus, the system has to be designed in a way thatwit a high probability the number
of Eve’s miss-detections exceeds the required upper-boundfor edit distance with the original set,
to make sure that even with the use of public information she can not generate the same key.
This can be ensured by taking advantage of statistical independence between legitimate users and
adversary’s channels as well as an authenticated but insecure feedback channel between Bob and
Alice modeled as a binary erasure channel. Note that in this scenario there will not be any need for
a virtual oracle as it was assumed in Chapter 3 to analyze secrecy of the system.
5.2.2 More Efficient ARQ Protocols and Broadcasting Scenario
Stop and wait ARQ protocol that we utilized in our key management algorithm is not efficient in
real-life implementation and using it brings about a low throughput for communications. There are
some other more efficient ARQ protocols like Go-back-N and selective repeat ARQ. In Go-back-N
protocol, the transmitter continues sending a number of frames specified by a window size even
without receiving an ACK from receiver which generates a higher t roughput compared to stop and
wait protocol. Selective repeat ARQ results in even a higher effici ncy because unlike Go-back-N,
in this protocol after a lost frame, the sender continues to send a number of frames specified by its
window size, and the receiver accepts and acknowledges packets after a transmission error. If we
adopt either Go-back-N or selective repeat ARQ to achieve a higher transmission throughput in
our key scheduling scheme, OTF gathering strategies for Alice and Bob have to change, and a new
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secrecy analysis will be required. In this analysis, we needto take into account communication
efficiency and throughput, quality of secrecy (secrecy outage probability) and efficiency of secrecy
establishment (secret key rate). Furthermore, the trade-off between these metrics is needed to be
studied.
Another issue is how to extend ARQ based key scheduling to broadcasting scenario for the pur-
pose of sharing keys between base station and users. In ordert prevent disadvantages of using
simple ARQ in broadcast channels including throughput deficiency, we can utilize Hybrid ARQ
(HARQ) mechanism that takes advantage of both error detection and error correction to deliver a
higher throughput. In [101] different HARQ schemes are proposed to be used in broadcast chan-
nel that can provide acceptable throughput for the system. In [102] and [103] two different secure
HARQ schemes are presented that make use of the exiting potential in HARQ mechanism to im-
prove security of the system by combining encoding and symmetric key encryption in one step
called secrecy encoder. As a result, instead of pure stop andw it protocol we used in Chapter
3, we can design a HARQ mechanism that along with a high secrecyeffi iency, provides the re-
quired throughput over multiuser channel. Note that a new secrecy design and analysis for key
scheduling step is required since a new HARQ protocol is exploited by considering both error cor-
rection ability of HARQ and multiuser scenario. Then, the obtained secret keys can be utilized in
a well-designed secrecy encoding that is a secret-key-based r ndomized encoder to ensure relia-
bility as well as highly confidential message transmission.In this scenario each user generates its
keys based on the statistical data obtained from HARQ mechanism when it is guaranteed that their
gathered data maintains its required edit distance from theoriginal set through feedback messages
that is independently transmitted by each user.
5.2.3 New Non-Invertible Mapping Strategy
Let us consider a higher order IIR filter instead of a first order filter used for mapping OTF set into
a destination set. LetX(n) andW (n) be respectively the input OTF packet and output destination
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packet at timen. If for instance we consider a second order IIR filter with thefollowing relationship
between input and output packets as
W (n) = b0X(n) + b1X(n− 1) + b2X(n− 2) + a1W (n− 1) + a2W (n− 2), (5.1)








1− a1Z−1 − a2Z−2
. (5.2)
In this case the first output packet will beW (1) = b0X(1) and the second oneW (2) = b0X(2) +
(b1 + a1b0)X(1). As can be seen,X(1) has weightb0 for W (1) and weightb1 + a1b0 for W (2).
Namely, by using a higher order IIR filter we can infer that each input packet contributes with a
varying weight to each output packet. Basically, by using a higher order IIR filter we cause more
confusion for Eve such that she has to take a more sophisticated at ack strategy rather than just
simply estimating an error that appears as a constant differenc between her set and the original
set after misdetection. We should note that in case of using higher order IIR filter, we should also
take into account the issue of stability and make sure that coeffi ients of this transfer function are
designed in a way that stability is guaranteed.
If a higher order IIR filter is used as mapping strategy, Eve needs to first deal with the ambiguity
problem to know where errors have occurred and then estimateerror sequence in her set. If we
consider that each misdetected packet acts like an additivenois in Eve’s destination set, in case
of using a higher order IIR filter, it is like this additive noise goes through a channel with transfer
function of the utilized digital filter. As a result, a possible attack strategy would be applying inverse
mapping in order to estimate this noise and to recover the original OTF packets. In this strategy
Eve models these misdetected packets in her OTF set as additive noise that goes through this filter.
Therefore, she can use some estimation techniques like Kalman filter or MMSE (Minimum Mean
Square Error) to estimate the existing error in her destinatio set and then to apply inverse mapping
in order to find the original packet errors in her guessed OTF set.
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As a possible approach, if we designA(Z) andB(Z) in denominator and nominator of the filter
transfer function as feedback and feedforward filters to control their coefficients, we can have a
mapping strategy that is invertible impossible. By adoptinghis non-invertible mapping, we ensure
that Eve will not be able to apply inverse operation to estimate the original packet errors. Namely,
singularity in mapping obstructs Eve from estimating original errors in her OTF set. Moreover,
since Eve is not able to directly communicate with Alice, it is not possible for her to resolve this
singularity problem. On the other hand, Bob can communicate with Alice and use reconciliation
strategy or, in case of using fuzzy extractor, utilize received helper string to correct possible errors
in her gathered OTF set. This two-way communication guarantees hat singularity in mapping will
not cause any problem for legitimate users such that they canbe confident of generating the same
OTF sets that later on will be mapped to the same destination sets resulting in exactly the same
secret keys after universal hashing.
5.2.4 Novelty
The most important innovation in this work is using fuzzy extrac ors in order to allow some mar-
gin of difference between generated random sets in the receiver and transmitter measured with
edit distance. This allows us to design a system with less requir d overhead and thus increased
secrecy throughput. Meanwhile, it will make secrecy analysis of the system more straightforward
by removing the necessity to have an oracle and focusing on only the number of miss-detections
by Eve. On the other hand, using a higher order IIR filtering that is singular prohibits Eve from
applying inverse mapping in order to estimate her original packet errors unlike the previously pro-
posed mapping that allows her to just estimate original errors that appear as a constant difference
between her set and the original set.
Another novelty of this proposed scheme is extending the keyscheduling algorithm proposed in
Chapter 3 to broadcast channels by utilizing efficiency of theapplication of HARQ transmission
mechanism. We can also utilize potentiality of HARQ to designa secure HARQ by converting
106
its pure encoder into a secrecy encoder providing both errorcorrection and security based on the
generated key stream in previous transmissions. The new analysis for both secrecy outage rate and




6.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Suppose that all possible256−a key candidates are arranged ask1, k2, . . . , k256−a from the
lowest rank to the highest. LetHi be the hypothesis thatki is the original key andgi = 1 be the
event that Eve decides thatki is correct. We define a Bernoulli random variableB which is equal to
1 when the right key is among top256−a candidates, and0, otherwise. Thus,Pr[B = 0] = 1− Ps
andPr[B = 1] = Ps. Let Pc be the total success probability for Eve. Note that whenB = 0, the





Pr[gi = 1, Hi|B = 1].P r[B = 1]. (6.1)
The probability that Eve can realize the right keyki is
Pr[gi = 1, Hi|B = 1] = Pr[gi = 1|Hi, B = 1].P r[Hi|B = 1].
For Eve to be able to find the correct key at ranki, since she starts the test from upper ranks to the
lower ones, there should not be any false key acceptance for ranks higher thani, as well as a key
missing event for ranki. Hence,
Pr[gi = 1|Hi, B = 1] = (1− PF )2
56−a−i(1− Pm). (6.2)
Moreover, Decisions about all256−a keys are independent, and all of the tested keys are equally
probable to be the right one, i.e.Pr[Hi|B = 1] = 1256−a . Therefore, by using Eq.’s (6.1) and (6.2),
we obtain Eq. (2.8) for total success probability.
The next step is to compute the frame erasure probability. Assume that the right key iski and
is located among top256−a candidates. In order to obtain no key, Eve should not have any false
key admission forkj, j 6= i for i, j = 256 − 256−a + 1, . . . , 256, i.e. top256−a candidates except
108
the right key itself, and in addition to that she has to miss the right keyki. Whenki is not among
top candidates, since it will not be examined, Eve gets nothig provided that there has been no
wrong key acceptance event for top256−a tested candidates. As a result, frame erasure probability
can be computed according to Eq. (2.9). By a similar technique, we can prove that the wrong key
probability isPw = 1− Pe − Pc.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We need to compute vector transition probabilities betweenall possible input and output
vectorsX andY for statesS1 andS3. Hence, fork = 1, 3
Pr[Y |X,Sk] = Pr[X ⊕ Y |X,Sk] = Pr[E|Sk], (6.3)
whereE is the decryption error vector which is bit-wise Xor of inputand output vectors. The last
equality is becauseE depends on channel errors in previous and current ciphertexts, so given the
state, it is independent from input vectorX. To analyze statesS0 andS1, we define two events,A
andB as
A : There exists at least one bit error in̂Ci
B : There exists at least one bit error in̂Ci−1.
As a result,S1 = A ∩ B̄, and we can write
Pr(E|S1) =Pr(E|A, B̄) =
Pr(E|B̄)Pr(A|E, B̄)
Pr(A|B̄) . (6.4)
The fact that eventsA andB are caused by two independent channel error vectorsZi−1 and
Zi implies thatA is independent ofB and its complementary, i.e.Pr(A|B̄) = Pr(A) = q. When
eventB has not occurred, since onlŷCi can induce bit errors with rate ofη into the stored plaintext,
the probability that a particular decryption error vectorE with Hamming weight ofW (E) takes
place will be
Pr(E|B̄) = ηW (E)(1− η)64−W (E). (6.5)
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In stateS1, HW of error vectorE can not be zero because we know that the only source that
can induce error at stagei is Zi that surely has a non-zero bit. In this case, given an error vector
E with W (E) 6= 0 and knowing that eventB did not occur, we can infer that this error is induced
by error inĈi, hence eventA has certainly occurred, i.e.Pr(A|E, B̄) = 1. Thus, using equations
(6.3), (6.4) and (6.5), we can obtain the input-output transition probability inS1 as in Eq. (2.12).
Similarly, for stateS3, Pr(Y |X,S3) can be computed with the detailed proof provided in our
technical report [104].
6.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. If we assume that all264 possible input plaintexts are equally likely, forl = 1, 3 we can
write












Pr(E = Ej|Sl) logPr(E = Ej|Sl). (6.6)
The second equality is resulted from Eq. (6.3) forEi,j = Xi ⊕ Yj as the decryption error vector.
Furthermore, for stateS1 as discussed in subsection 2.4.1, HW of the error vectorE can not be
zero. Thus, we can takeE1 as a64-bit zero vector and exclude it from this summation. Then, using
Eq. (2.12) brings about the following result






ηW (Ej)(1− η)64−W (Ej). log
[




We know that out of all264 error vectors, the number of possible vectors with HW ofW is the
number of possibilities of choosingW bits out of64 bits which is equal toW -combinations from
64 elements. Finally, Eq. (6.7) can be rewritten as Eq. (2.18) by excludingk = 0. For stateS3, we
computeH(Y |S3, X) using Eq. (6.6) forl = 3. In this case,j = 1 is not excluded because unlike
stateS1 in stateS3, it is possible to have decryption error vectorE1 with zero weight. Thus, by
using Eq. (2.13), we obtainH(Y |S3, X) in Eq. (2.19).
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6.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Let Eim and e
i
m be the random variablesEm and em, respectively, associated with one-
time transmission and feedback reception of packeti by Bob. Also, letEiw ande
i
w be the random
variablesEw andew, associated with one-time transmission and feedback reception of packetiE
by Eve. We assume that transmission of each packet and its associ ted feedback is independent
for different packets while their corresponding events of correct receptions or failures for different





andeiw with Em, em, Ew andew, respectively. Eq. (3.6) can be rewritten as




Since hypothesisH1 occurs whenFi = 1 and packeti is received correctly by Bob, using Bayesian
rule we get
Pr[H1|FiE , Eiw = 0] = Pr[Fi = 1|Eim = 0, Eiw = 0, FiE ]Pr[Eim = 0, FiE |Eiw = 0]. (6.9)
In this Eq. since the erasure in the received feedback by Bob, i.e. Fi, is independent from the
erasure in Eve’s received packet, the first term can be written
Pr[Fi = 1|Eim = 0, FiE ] =
Pr[Fi = 1, FiE |Eim = 0]
Pr[FiE |Eim = 0]
. (6.10)
First of all, we consider the case where Eve has received feedbackFiE = 1. Then, the second term
in Eq. (6.9) will be one because receiving feedbackFiE = 1 by Eve implies that it was initially
received error-free by Bob. By using Eq. (6.10), we can rewritethe first term in Eq. (6.9) as
Pr[Fi = 1|Eim = 0, FiE = 1] =
Pr[eim = 0, e
i
w = 0|Eim = 0]




1− η − θ + q11
1− θ .
(6.11)
The second equality is resulted from the definition of joint backward erasure probabilities. The
third equality comes from relationshipsq00 + q01 = Pr[eim = 0] = 1− η andq01 + q11 = Pr[eiw =
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1] = θ, with q11 given in Eq. (3.4). Thus, by Eq’s (6.9) and (6.11), we can write the decision rule
(6.8) as
[








This is equivalent toΓ > 0 as it was defined in (3.7).
Next, suppose that Eve has received an erased feedbackFiE = e. Due to independence of the
packet reception by Bob and feedback reception by Eve, we can show that the second term of Eq.
(6.9) will be
Pr[Eim = 0|Eiw = 0] =







1− δ − ε+ p11
1− ε . (6.13)
Similarly, by Eq. (6.10), the first term in Eq. (6.9) will be




Now by replacing Eq.’s (6.13) and (6.14) into Eq. (6.9), we can get the decision rule in Eq. (6.8) as
[













According to the definition ofΛ in (3.8), it is equivalent to the decision ruleΛ > 0 for FiE = e.
6.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. According to the definition of OTF packet missing probability, by using Bayesian rule we
have
Pm =Pr[iE 6∈ OTFE|H1] (6.16)
=Pr[iE 6∈ OTFE|H1, FiE = 1, Eiw = 0]Pr[FiE = 1, Eiw = 0|H1]
+Pr[iE 6∈ OTFE|H1, FiE = e, Eiw = 0]Pr[FiE = e, Eiw = 0|H1]
+Pr[iE 6∈ OTFE|H1, Eiw = 1]Pr[Eiw = 1|H1],
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where OTFE denotes Eve’s chosen OTF set, and ‘Eiw = 1’ means Eve did not receiveiE correctly.
By definition,H1 is equivalent to the event[eim = 0, E
i
m = 0], so we have
Pr[FiE = 1, E
i






1− η − θ + q11
1− η .
1− δ − ε+ p11
1− δ , (6.17)
wherep11 andq11 are given in Eq. (3.4). Similarly, we can show
Pr[FiE = e, E
i
w = 0|H1] =
(θ − q11)[1− δ − ε+ p11]
(1− η)(1− δ) . (6.18)
We can compute the last term in Eq. (6.16) as
Pr[Eiw = 1|Eim = 0, Fi = 1] =
ε− p11
1− δ . (6.19)
For a correctly received packet by Eve, with the received feeback asFiE = 1, she will not put
packetiE into OTFE if Γ < 0. If FiE = e, iE will not belong to Eve’s OTF ifΛ < 0. Apparently,
when ‘Eiw = 1’, regardless of what the received feedback would be, she hasno way to putiE in
OTFE. Hence,
Pr[iE 6∈ OTFE|H1, FiE = 1, Eiw = 0] = 1(Γ<0)
Pr[iE 6∈ OTFE|H1, FiE = e, Eiw = 0] = 1(Λ<0)
Pr[iE 6∈ OTFE|H1, Eiw = 1] = 1. (6.20)
By replacing Eq.’s (6.17)-(6.20) into Eq. (6.16), we can get th formula forPm in Eq. (3.9).
To compute the false OTF probability which isPF = Pr[iE ∈ OTF|H0], we split hypothesis
H0 into two events:H01 when packeti is received incorrectly by Bob, andH02 wheni is received
without error, butFi = e. It should be noted that according to Eve’s strategy, false det ction event
only occurs whenSRiE = 0 andPiE+1 6= PiE because she only cares about fresh packets. We
definePF1 as the false OTF probability whenH01 takes place, which is
PF1 =Pr[iE ∈ OTF|H01] (6.21)
=Pr[iE ∈ OTF|H01, FiE = e, Eiw = 0]Pr[FiE = e, Eiw = 0|H01].
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That is because whenH01 occurs, since Bob has not decodedi correctly, he will send back a Nack
which can be received either erased bit or zero that in the latt r case Eve will certainly not put it
into OTF. According to Eve’s strategy in Tab. 3.4, for a correctly received packetiE once receiving
FiE = e, Eve putsiE into OTF ifΛ > 0, so
Pr[iE ∈ OTF|H01, FiE = e, Eiw = 0] = 1(Λ>0). (6.22)
Moreover, the erasure event in the received feedback by Eve is independent of the reception of
packetiE andi. As a result, the second term in Eq. (6.21) will be
Pr[FiE = e, E
i












We also definePF2 as the false OTF probability whenH02 occurs. We can similarly show that
PF2 =
[1(Λ>0)q11 + 1(Γ>0)(η − q11)](1− δ − η + p11)
η(1− δ) . (6.25)
Now, we can obtain the total false OTF probability as
PF =PF1Pr[H01] + PF2Pr[H02] = PF1δ + PF2(1− δ)η,
replacingPF1 , PF2 from Eq.’s (6.24), (6.25) completes the proof.
6.6 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let Xi denote the packets in OTF fori = 1, . . . , nts, andYi indicate the packets in Eve’s
OTF. We denote the number of Alice and Bob’s Bernoulli trials betweeni − 1st andith successes
in putting in OTF asTi. Ti’s are i.i.d. random variables with geometric distribution. LetNe denote
the number of mismatches between two destination sets. Outage probability is defined as the prob-
ability that there exists less thanl packet discrepancies between two destination sets that occurs
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when there is at leastnts − l + 1 packets to be the same forV andW . It means that misalignment
would happen afternts − l + 1th packet in OTFE. Hence, we have,
Pout =Pr(Ne < l)
(1)






































1− (1− Pc)(1− PF )
]nts−l+1
. (6.26)
Equality(2) is because the decision that receiver makes about each packet is independent of other
packets. Equality(3) is based on Bayesian rule by summing over all possible number of trials for
each Bernoulli success. For the first success it can reach to the t tal number of packets within the
frame, i.e.M , but for the next ones, we should subtract the number of all previous trials. Equality
(5) holds since to haveXi = Yi, neither should there be missing OTF event for Eve for packetXi
at theith Bernoulli success nor any false detection event for the rest of unsuccessful OTF Bernoulli
events that are totallyTi − 1 trials. Conclusively, inequalities(4) and (7) show that Eq. (3.13)
provides an upper-bound forPout.
6.7 Universality of⊙ multiplication in GF (qn)
Proof. We first prove Condition 1 of universality for the functionhs defined ash(S,X) = truncb[S⊙
X]. For the collision probability of this function we can write
Pr[S ∈ SD : h(S,X) = h(S,X ′)] = Pr
[
S ∈ SD, ∃R ∈ Ωn−b\0n−b : S ⊙ (X ⊕X ′) = (0b, R)
]
≤ (qn−b − 1) 1





SinceX ⊕X ′ 6= 0, we can find at most oneS ∈ Ωn\0n for whichS ⊙ (X ⊕X ′) = (0b, R) with
R 6= 0. The last inequality holds since fora ≤ b we havea−1
b−1 ≤ ab .
For the second condition consider a randomly chosenS. We can see thath−1(R, S,A) = S−1⊙
(A||R) is uniformly distributed over the preimage setXA = {X ∈ Ωn, h(X,S) = A} which has
cardinality ofqn−b, implying that|h−1s (A)| = qn−b. That is because a uniformly chosenR over
the setΩn−b determines whichX ∈ XA generates(A||R) after multiplication byS. There exists
qb such preimage sets that are disjoint and have cardinality tha does not depend onA. Contrarily,
if there exists an element in bothXA andXA′ with A 6= A′, it means thatS−1 ⊙ (A||R) =
S−1 ⊙ (A′||R′). ForR 6= R′ it is impossible to hold, but forR = R′ it requires thatA = A′ which
is contradictory. Therefore,|h−1s (A)| = |XA| = qn−b which does not depend onA.
6.8 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that the statement holds forEsH1+α(Q), whereEs denotes the
expectation overS. Then, we can find a functionhs for which the inequality (4.2) holds. Due to
convexity of the function−1
α
























′) = hs(x) = ζ]
α
whereζ is a realization of random variableQ. If condition 2 of universality holds for the ensemble
of functionshs, it implies that preimages of differentζ ’s (i.e.h−1s (ζ)) are distinct. Therefore, taking
expectation over random variableQ is equivalent to averaging overX. For the second term in this
equation the probability of occurrence of a particularζ is equivalent to finding probability of its
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Pr(S = S ′) [Pr(x′ = x) + Pr(hs(x












Inequality 2 is resulted from the universality property of the family of hash functionshs that maps
Ω to the set of size|K|. The equality 3 holds since the random variableS is uniform randomly























































Finally, using the inequalitylog(1 + x) ≤ x and the facts thaths(X) = Q andH1+α(X) ≥ δ
proves the statement forEsH1+α(Q) and hence for Eq. (4.2).
6.9 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Based on the definition of the Shannon and Rényi entropy we shallwrite







































Forα > 0, −1
α
log(.) is a convex function, so by using Jensen’s inequality it can be concluded that





















α+1 = H1+α(X, Y ).
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